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This paper studies the choice of electoral rules, in particular, the question of minority representation.
Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral rules. With
the aim of explaining changes in electoral rules adopted by US cities (particularly in the South), we
show why majorities tend to adopt "winner-take-all" city-wide rules (at-large elections) in response
to an increase in the size of the minority when the minority they are facing is relatively small. In this
case, for the majority it is more effective to leverage on its sheer size instead of risking to concede
representation to voters from minority-elected districts. However, as the minority becomes larger
(closer to a fifty-fifty split), the possibility of losing the whole city induces the majority to prefer
minority votes to be confined in minority-packed districts. Single-member district rules serve this


















trebbi@fas.harvard.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the key questions in political economy is how diﬀerent electoral laws aﬀect
policy outcomes. In order to provide an answer several authors take electoral
rules as exogenous or predetermined and use them as explanatory variables for
various policies1. However, the rules of government are themselves endogenous
variables chosen at constitutional tables. Ideally, rules should be chosen behind
a ”veil of ignorance”, that is decisions should be taken as if one ignored the
identity of those beneﬁting from the choices themselves. In reality, however, in
most constitutional tables the veil of ignorance is ”see-through”, in the sense
that there is some knowledge of who would beneﬁt under alternative rules and
of what policy outcomes those rules would produce. Therefore the ”exogeneity”
of constitutions can be called into question.
Our focus is on the question of minority representation, with special refer-
ence to the nature of electoral districts and alternative rules for the choice of
representatives. We have two goals in mind, one more general and one more
speciﬁc. The ﬁrst and more general point is to make progress in modeling in-
stitutional choice as endogenous. On the ﬁrst point, most of the literature is
normative, i.e. it discusses how electoral laws should be chosen, starting from
the work of Hayek (1960) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962)2.A n o r m a t i v e
approach usually characterizes works in Political Science, with some notable ex-
ception such as Riker (1986) and several essays in Colomer (2004).Economists
have only recently began to pay attention to the endogeneity of political insti-
1A classic study is Lijphart (1994). The most recent contributions on the eﬀects of insti-
tutions (taken as exogenous or prestermined) on economic policies are Persson and Tabellini
(2003) for a sample of democratic countries and Baqir (2003) for a cross-section of US cities.
They build upon a vast literature on the eﬀects of alternative forms of government on policies,
a literature that we do not review here. We refer the reader to Persson and Tabellini (2003) for
a survey of the cross-country literature. On US states see in particular Alt and Lowry (1994),
Poterba (1994), and Bohn and Inman (1996) amongst others. Mulligan and Sala I Martin
(2004) oﬀer a dissenting view, namely that policies are determined by lobbying pressure that
are not much aﬀected by institutional forms of government.
2For a survey of the literature on Constitutional Theory, see Voigt (1997).
2tutions from a positive, as opposed to a normative perspective. Alesina and
Glaeser (2004) for instance discuss how the choice of alternative electoral rules,
which are themselves associated with diﬀerent policy choices over the welfare
state, are indeed the result of strategic constitutional choices. The present pa-
per is a study in ”positive constitutional theory”, with a special emphasis on
the question of how majorities select electoral rules to partially disenfranchise
minorities.
The second and more speciﬁc goal of our paper is to analyze the evolution
of minority representation in American cities. We examine empirical evidence
drawn from US municipalities, that adopt two types of electoral rules: either a
single-member district (also called single-district) or at-large rules (or a com-
bination of the two). Councilmen elected by district compete for one or, more
rarely, multiple seats in each geographic subdivision (district or ward) of the
city. Diﬀerently, in at-large elections, oﬃcials are elected in multi-member plu-
rality districts, voters have as many votes as there are council seats, and the
only multi-member district is identiﬁed by the city itself. The basic ”winner-
take-all” logic holds for both rules. For given council size, the diﬀerence between
single-district and at-large rules is due to geographic clustering of groups of vot-
ers with homogeneous preferences3. We show why majorities at the constitution
design stage tend to adopt at-large electoral rules in response to an increase in
the size of the minority when the minority they are facing is relatively small.
In this case, as the size of the minority increases, for the majority it becomes
more eﬀective to leverage on its sheer size instead of risking to concede repre-
sentation to voters from minority-elected districts. However, as the minority
becomes larger (closer to a ﬁfty-ﬁfty split), the possibility of losing the whole
city induces the majority to prefer minority votes to be conﬁn e di nm i n o r i t y -
packed districts. Single-member district electoral rules serve this purpose. This
shift in the preferences of the (constitutional) majority, ﬁrst towards an at-large
3See Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999) for a detailed account of racial segregation patterns
in the United States. The assumption of geographic clustering will be maintained throughout
the paper.
3electoral rule, and then towards a single-district rule as the size of the minority
increases, is precisely what the data show.
When discussing local politics in the US, one is immediately thrown into the
area of race relations.4 In fact, it is quite compelling to identify the ”majority”
with the whites and the ”minority” with racial ”minorities” (perfect choice of
words!). The evolution of voting rights, especially in the South, allows us to
test implications of the model regarding the endogenous institutional choice.
Until the mid-sixties, before the civil right movement and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, racial minorities (mainly blacks) in the South were essentially
disenfranchised by a battery of regulations that, although color-blind on paper,
were in practice directed to severely limit black vote. In this context the choice
of electoral rules and forms of governments had not much to do with a white
majorities’ attempt at controlling black inﬂuence on city governments, since
blacks did not vote. After the mid-sixties, due to novel federal Voting Rights
legislation, black inﬂuence increased substantially in terms of their ability to
elect representatives. Indeed, after the Voting Rights Act of 1965, we show that
decisions about electoral rules reﬂected changes in the relative size of the white
and black populations in a way consistent with our model.
Manipulation of electoral rules is not a prerogative exclusive of American
cities. Alexander (2005, p.211) describes in detail the 1947 Gaullist manipula-
tions of electoral rules in France. In the Paris area where the Gaullist alliance
was weak they introduced proportional representation, in rural areas where the
alliance was strong, they introduced plurality rule. Krenzer (2005, p.229) de-
scribes strategic manipulation in Germany. One could go on.
Our empirical results on (within-)US cities variation are quite consistent
with previous ﬁndings on the cross-country evidence in Alesina, Aghion, and
Trebbi (2004). In both cases constitutional choices do not seem to occur behind
4For discussion of the importance of race in American local politics, see for instance Hacker
(1992), Huckfeld and Kohfeld (1989) and Wilson (1996) amongst many others. Alesina, Baqir,
and Hoxby (2004) argue that even the design and number of local jurisdictions in the US
depends upon race relations.
4a veil of ignorance in the sense that, as the minority increases its size and/or its
political rights, the majority tries to make constitutional changes that limit the
protection of minorities, while behind a veil of ignorance exactly the opposite
should happen (as one would take into account the likelihood of belonging to a
minority).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the model. Section
3 describes the institutional context of US city government to which the model
is applied and our data. Section 4 illustrates our empirical results. The last
section concludes.
2 The model
The structure of the model is as follows. There are two groups of voters, whites
(W) and blacks (B). We denote the initial relative size of group B as π>0, so
t h a tt h es i z eo fg r o u pW is (1−π). The whites are, initially at least, a majority
(we restrict π<1/2) and they are those who choose the electoral rule for the
city (in short, we call the choice of the electoral rule: "constitution"). This is
because either the blacks are disenfranchised at the time of the constitutional
choice or they were outvoted at the constitutional table. The white choose
a constitution with an eye on maximizing their expected utility arising from
a policy outcome which will be decided by an elected council. In order to
make the problem interesting there is uncertainty in the relative share of the W
and B voters, so that the constitutional writers cannot be sure ex ante of the
composition of the council. In other words, there is a shock to the composition
o ft h ee l e c t o r a t eb e t w e e nt h ew r i t i n go ft h ec o n s t i t u t i o na n dt h ec h o i c eo ft h e
policy. Moreover, the composition of the council depends on the electoral rule
chosen. This modeling strategy builds upon the incomplete social contracts
ideas of Aghion and Bolton (2003). We now present the model more formally.
52.1 Agents and expected utility
We ﬁrst present a basic version of the model. We discuss extensions later. The
population is equally spread over three electoral districts, numbered 1,2,3,a n d
with M individuals in each. Each district chooses a seat in the council. The
initial number of B and W voters in each district are given by Bi and Wi for
i =1 ,2,3. We assume that:
W1 = M;




where z is a real number between −1/4 and 1/2. In other words, the parameter
z will allow us to make comparative statics on the initial number of B voters in
districts 2 and 3. Note that this range of variation for z insures that 0 <π<1/2.
Thus, z parametrizes the size of the ex ante W majority. Indeed, we have:
X
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Thus, initially the W voters have a majority and they can choose the electoral
rule (constitution). Given the electoral rule, a three-member council is elected.
The council decides the policy. After the constitution is chosen, there is a shock
to the composition of voters in the city, to which the electoral rule cannot be
made contingent upon.
More formally, we suppose that during the interim phase an exogenously
given mass LN of new B voters joins the polity5 ,w i t hLN = αM where α is a
random variable uniformly distributed between 0 and an upper bound α ∈ (1,2).
Moreover, we assume that the newcomers are not evenly distributed across the
5One could assume that mobility across cities is aﬀected by the nature of charter rules,
electoral systems, and the identity of the mayor, an issue which we do not tackle in the model.
See Epple and Romer (1991) for a classic treatment of endogenous mobility in a political
economy model. However, empirical evidence of Tiebout sorting is scant. See Strumpf and
Oberholzer-Gee (2002). We discuss this eﬀect in Section 4.
6three districts, but that instead one half of them joins district 2,w h e r e a st h e
remaining half goes to district 3 (thus, no new B voter enters district 1).
Diﬀerent compositions of the council imply diﬀerent policies. We assume
that with no W representative and three B representatives the implemented
policy is most unfavorable to the W group which obtains a low utility level r.
With one W representative the W group ends up with the status quo utility
level u0; with two or three representatives the W group achieves its maximum
utility level r. (Think of r as being the result of the B group’s most favorable
policy being implemented, and of r as being the outcome of the W group’s most
favorable policy).
This last assumption is twofold. First, note that the W group is advan-
taged: with two W councilmen the W bliss point obtains and with only one
W councilman the status quo obtains. This may capture either one of two
empirical features, or both. One is some inherent advantage of W; another,
more interestingly, may capture the functioning of a council in the presence of
a W mayor. For the moment we are ignoring the role of the mayor and the
speciﬁcs of the form of government, but we will return to this below. Second,
the assumption implies that the size of the B majority matters for the policy
outcome; a two-one B majority implies a diﬀerent policy from a three-zero B
majority6. In any event the speciﬁcs of the policy outcome formulation do not
aﬀect the qualitative nature of the results, as we discuss below.
The ex ante expected utility of a W constitution writer is then equal to:
Uw =( 1− p0 − p1)r + p1u0 + p0r,
where pj denotes the probability that j council representatives belong to the
W− group at the interim stage. The choice of electoral rules (the constitution)
chosen by the W voters will determine the value of p0 and p1.
Summarizing, the timing of events is as follows:
1. Electoral rules are chosen by the W group.
6See Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) for an extensive discussion of this assumption and a
comparison with alternatives.
72. The interim distribution of preferences is realized, which translates into a
majority of the council.
3. Payoﬀs realize.
2.2 Electoral rules and ex ante expected utilities
With an eye to the case of American cities, we now study two alternative elec-
toral rules. The ﬁrst one, referred to as representation "at-large" (AL), allocates
all seats to the party that wins more than ﬁfty percent of the votes. The sec-
ond rule, referred to as ”single-member district rule” (SD), requires that each
candidate runs in a particular district and obtains a majority of votes within
the district in order to be elected.
Given our above assumptions as to the group composition of the three dis-
tricts, we immediately have that p1 =0under the AL rule, whereas p0 =0
under the SD rule. We now compute the expected ex ante utilities of constitu-
tion writers in the W− group, respectively under these two electoral rules.
2.2.1 Expected utility under the at-large rule
Under the AL rule all council seats will go to the B group if and only if:
B1 + B2 + B3 + LN >W 1 + W2 + W3.
Then, the ex ante expected utility of constitution writers in the W− group can
be simply expressed as
UAL
W = p0r +( 1− p0)r = r − p0∆,
where ∆ = r − r is the constitution writers’ loss from losing the majority, and
p0 =P r ( B1 + B2 + B3 + LN >W 1 + W2 + W3)=P r ( α>1+4 z)
is the probability of losing the majority. Substituting for z as a function of π
using (1), we have:








8so that the ex ante expected loss of constitution writers in the W− group under
the AL rule, is equal to:
LAL




w h e r ew eu s et h en o t a t i o n
x+ =m a x {x,0}.
2.2.2 Ex ante expected utility under the single-member district rule
Under the SD rule council seats are allocated at the district level. The probabil-
ity of the B− group winning a majority of two seats is equal to the probability
that districts 2 and 3 be won by the B group. Given that the same fraction of
new B voters are allocated to these two districts, which already start with the
same fraction of B voters ex ante, and given that there is a ﬁxed majority of W
voters in district 1, we immediately get that the B− group obtains a two-seat
majority with probability:
p1 =P r ( B3 +
1
2
αM > W3)=p1 =P r ( α>4z)




(1 − 3π)+)+. (3)
We can then re-express the ex ante utility of constitution writers in the W−
group under the SD rule, as:
USD
W = p1u0 +( 1− p1)r = r − p1δ,
where δ = r − u0 is the constitution writers’ loss from losing the majority, and
therefore
LSD




is the expected loss of constitution writers in the W− group under the SD rule.
92.3 The size of minorities and the choice of electoral rule
Ex ante at the constitutional stage, individuals in the W− group will simply
choose the electoral rule that minimizes the expected loss LW. Our main the-
oretical prediction can be summarized intuitively as follows. If initially the W
group commands a very large majority of votes, the constitution writers do not
fear they can lose the majority under either rule, thus they are indiﬀerent be-
tween the two rules. As the relative size of the B−group increases, however,
at some point it becomes preferable for constitution writers in the W−group
to move to AL in order to reduce the power of the B− voters in districts 2,
3 by confronting them with the whole pool of W− voters, including those in
district 1. Doing so allows the W−group to preserve its majority as long as
the fraction of B−individuals does not become too large. Finally, when the
fraction of B−voters becomes suﬃciently large that it becomes impossible to
prevent their becoming the new majority, moving back to the SD rule allows
the W−group to limit their losses: indeed, as π becomes suﬃciently close to
1/2 , the risk of losing all three districts and of thereby incurring the large loss
∆, makes the W−group prefer a SD system which guarantees them at least
1 seat in the council -and thereby limits their loss to δ< <∆- given that in
this case B−v o t e r sa r er e s t r i c t e dt oc o m m a n d i n gd i s t r i c t s2a n d3o n l y . N o t
surprisingly, this latter motive from moving back from AL to SD disappears if
the loss incurred by the minority is independent of the size of the majority, that
is if ∆ = δ.
More formally, we can state:
Proposition 1 (a) Both rules AL and SD involve no utility loss to W−group
individuals when π ∈ (0, 1
3 − α
6); (b) if ∆
δ > (1− 1
α)−1, then there exists a unique




















10(c) if ∆ = δ, then for all π ∈ (1
3 − α
6, 1
2) the AL rule dominates the SD rule.































existence of a unique cut-oﬀ b π ∈ (1
2 − α
6, 1
3) with the desired properties. Finally,
to establish part (c), let us reason by contradiction and suppose that for some









(1 − 3π)+)+ < (1 −
3
α
(1 − 2π))+. (4)
First, this cannot be the case for π ∈ (1
3, 1
2) s i n c ei nt h a tc a s e( 4 )b e c o m e s :




which is impossible if π<1/2. Second, suppose that (4) holds for some π<1/3.




































again an impossibility. This establishes the proposition.
This proposition can be generalized to the case of N districts. We do so in
the following extensions.
113E x t e n s i o n s
3.1 The N district case
Suppose the polity’s population is equally spread over the electoral districts, now
numbered 1,...,N,a n dw i t hM individuals in each. We maintain the assumption






where again W1 districts are ”all-W” while W2 districts are an identical mix of
W and B. We also maintain the assumption that district design is exogenously
given as we focus on the electoral rule for given district design. There are N1
districts like W1, therefore N2 = N − N1. For N2 <N 1, it is clear that under
SD the W group cannot be blocked, no matter how large the group αM of B
voters is. We exclude this instance and focus on the more interesting case where
N2 >N 1.
Now consider the blocking probabilities under AL and under SD respec-
tively. Blocking under AL will occur whenever the ex post total number of
W−voters, NM(1 − π), is larger than the ex post total number of B−voters,
αM +NMπ. Thus, nothing fundamental changes from the three-districts case,









T u r n i n gt ot h eSD rule, let us ﬁrst assume that each district j of the N2
districts receives a fraction 1
N2 of new comers, all of them belonging to the B−
group. In this case the probability that the B−group wins a majority of seats
on the council, is simply equal to the probability that the B−group acquire a
majority of votes in any of the W2 districts, namely




























Once again, the constitution writers will choose the electoral rule that in-
volves the lowest ex ante expected loss, where
LAL













where it is reasonable to assume that the loss δ(N2) to the W−group if the
B−group acquires majority of seats on the council, is non-decreasing in the
number of seats N2 the B−group holds in that case.
Assume
α<N 2.
Then for π very close to zero, both LAL
W and LSD
W are equal to zero, so that
constitution writers are indiﬀerent between the two electoral rules. Next, note











so that as π increases away from zero, LSD
W becomes positive before LAL
W does;
this in turn implies that for intermediate values of π, constitution writers in
the W−group will prefer the AL rule to the SD rule, as the former dilutes the
B−votes among the whole W−population. Finally, as π becomes arbitrarily
close to 1
2, the expected loss LAL
W under AL converges to ∆, whereas the expected
loss LSD
W converges to (1+ N−N2
α )δ(N2). It then follows that the W−group will
choose the SD rule whenever(1 + N−N2
α )δ(N2) < ∆.
We thus obtain a straightforward generalization of Proposition 1 to the more
general case where the number of districts N is arbitrary. Note however that
13condition (5) becomes hard to satisfy when the number N2 of W2 districts
becomes arbitrarily close to N.
3.2 Uneven distribution of newcomers
In order to gain intuition in this and the following subsections, let us return
to the three-district model employed in Section 2.1. In our analysis so far we
assumed that equal numbers of new B− group voters would choose to locate
in districts 2 and 3. However, our reasoning and result extend to the case
where a fraction f>1/2 of new comers choose say district 2 whereas the
remaining fraction (1 − f) chooses district 3. This obviously does not aﬀect
the probability p0 of the B− group winning all seats under the AL rule since
that probability depends only upon the overall fraction of B− individuals in the











However, the B− group will only win a majority of seats on the council if it
wins a majority of votes in districts 2 and 3, which in turn requires that it win
a majority of votes in district 3, which, of the two districts, is the harder one to
win. Therefore,




















14so that p0 = p1 =0for π suﬃciently small.
Then, it is easy to show that Proposition 1 continues to holds in its entirety
when












which implies that, as π increases from zero, p1 becomes positive before p0 does.
On the other hand, one can easily show that when (6) is violated, then the AL
rule is always weakly dominated by the SD rule when ∆
δ is suﬃciently large.
3.3 Gerrymandering
An important practical consideration is that the design of district may itself
be endogenous. In particular, the constitution writing majority may be try to
"gerrymander" the districts in order to minimize the number of representative
elected by the minority. The possibility of unconstrained gerrymandering obvi-
ously makes the SD rule preferable to a majority writing the constitution. As we
will discuss below, empirically this is an important consideration for American
cities. How advantageous for the white majority it is to choose gerrymandering
with a SD system versus an AL system, depends also on the nature of resi-
dential segregation in the city7.T h i si so fc o u r s eaw e l lk n o wi s s u ei nt h ev a s t
literature on gerrymandering.8
In the context of the above model, the constitution writers in the W− group
will simply choose to maximize f, that is, to pack as many new B−voters
as possible in one district, say district 2, in order to prevent them from ever
acquiring a majority of votes in the council. In the absence of any constraints
on gerrymandering (one such constraint for example would be that diﬀerentials
7Cole (1976) for instance emphasizes how at large elections, while in principle should favor
minorities which are spread out within city boundaries, in fact do not.
8On gerrymandering, see in particular Cox and Katz (2002) and Friedman and Holden
(2005).
15between the number of voters across the various districts cannot be larger than
a given percentage), the constitution writers will simply choose f equal to one,
in which case SD will always dominates AL. However, if various constraints
on gerrymandering limits the maximum f that can be achieved by constitution
writers in the W−group, then as we just saw in the previous subsection the
conclusions of Proposition 1 will again hold as long as f<2/3.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the possibility of gerrymandering could
give rise to the same pattern with AL dominating for intermediate values of π
and SL dominating for high values of π, even when the loss incurred by the
W−group is independent of the size of the B−majority, that is, even when
∆ = δ. To see this, let us slightly modify our basic model by assuming that as
in Proposition1 by assuming that constitution writers in the W−group suﬀer
from having the B−group hold even one (minority) seat in the council. Then,
as the size π of the B−group increases from zero to 1/2, the W−group will ﬁrst
choose the AL rule in order to dilute the B−voters among all W−voters as in
our previous analysis. But then, as π increases further, the only way to prevent
the B−group from winning a majority of seats is to move from AL to SD and
at the same time "gerrymander", that is pack all B−voters in one district.
Already without gerrymandering, the SD rule already allowed the W−group
to "waste" B−votes by preventing them from contaminating district 1. With
gerrymandering the wasting (or packing) eﬀect of SDis only reinforced: B−voters
cannot outnumber W−voters now in two districts instead of one in the absence
of gerrymandering. But the logic and predictions are basically the same with
and without gerrymandering.
3.4 Uniform distributions of voters across districts
Suppose the three districts are evenly aﬀected by any ex ante variation in the










and that new comers are also evenly distributed across the three districts. Then
the probabilities of the B−group winning under the AL and SD rules, are the





and the ex ante expected loss of constitution writers under the two rules are
also the same equal to
L = p0∆.
This underlies the importance of the unevenness of the distribution of B
within the electoral area (the city) if we want to explain why local constitutions
shift from one rule to another as the relative inﬂuence of B− voters increases.
In particular, the well known pattern of segregation in American cities makes
this uniform distribution case not relevant.
Now, suppose that while ex ante B−voters are evenly distributed across the
three districts, ex post new comers migrate only to districts 2 and 3. In that
case, the probability of the B−group winning under the AL rule is still equal





But then it is easy to see that constitution writers in the W− group will never



















for all π, as before as π increases away from zero, the ex ante expected loss
LSD
W will become positive before LAL
W does. Overall, as π increases from 0 to
1/2, constitution writers will ﬁrst be indiﬀerent between the two rules, then
17will prefer the AL rule because it dilutes B−votes, then may prefer the SD rule
because it reduces losses, but then eventually will always reverse to the AL rule.
As we shall see in the empirical analysis, this last reversal to the AL rule (which
is the one departure from Proposition 1) is not observed in our cross-city data.
3.5 Mayors and managers
Another dimension that diﬀerentiates between American cities, is the degree of
autonomy of the ”executive”. In a mayor-council system the executive is more
autonomous from the council. Therefore, it is more diﬃcult for the council to
inﬂuence the executive process relative to the council manager system. One
way of modelling this situation is to assume that the majority needed to block
the mayor is larger than the one needed to block a manager. An additional
variation involves the power of the mayors which is diﬀerent in strong mayors
versus weak mayor forms of governments, as discussed below.
Without a veil of ignorance, if the W majority always knew that it would
elect the mayor it would choose a more powerful mayor. But following the same
logic of above, this would not be necessarily the case if the W majority is slim
and there are unforeseeable shocks to the composition of the electorate. In the
empirical part we also brieﬂy explore the choice between mayor council system
and manager council systems.
3.6 Mayors and councils
Our analysis and main conclusions in Proposition 1, remain unaﬀected if we
replace the timing described in Section 2.1 by one in which: (i) the constitu-
tion is chosen; (ii) the mayor is elected; (iii) shocks to the composition of the
electorate occur; (iv) the council is elected; (v) the policy is chosen. With the
W−group having an ex ante majority they would choose the mayor. As we
have discussed above, our choice of policy outcomes for given composition of
the council can capture this institutional structure. Note that the latter im-
plies a non-simultaneous election of the mayor and the council, a feature that
18characterizes a sizeable fraction of American cities9.
What changes from Section 2.1 is that now, whenever the B− group obtains
a majority of seats on the council, it is their preferred policy which prevails
in equilibrium. This in turn implies that the loss incurred by the W−group
becomes independent of the electoral rule. But then, under the assumptions of
Proposition 1, with equal number of new B−voters in the two districts 2 and 3,
the W−group will always weakly prefer the AL rule since it dilutes B−voters
among the overall W−population whereas moving to the SD rule does no longer
limit losses to the W−group if they lose the majority. On the other hand, if
gerrymandering allows the W−group to pack all new B−voters in one district,
then the SD rule will always dominate as it prevents the B−group from ever
obtaining a majority of seats in the council.
4 Institutional setting and data
In our empirical investigation in the next sections, we shall focus on the main
prediction of our model, namely that an increase in the size of the minority
makes AL preferable over SD if initially the minority group (the B voters)
represents a suﬃciently small fraction of the overall population, whereas the
opposite is true if initially the minority group represents a suﬃciently large
fraction of the overall population. In other words, the preference of constitution
writers for AL over SD, increases and then decreases with the initial size of
the minority group.
With the aim of testing a (reduced form) model of endogenous choice of
checks and balances, Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004) employ data on a vast
cross-section of countries, including democracies and non-democracies. Ameri-
can cities oﬀer a potentially ”cleaner” sample for testing the hypothesis of con-
stitutional endogeneity consistently. First of all, American cities are much more
similar to each other than a cross-section of countries ranging from advanced
9See Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) for a discussion of staggered elections or simultaneous
elections at the national level.
19democracies to developing dictatorships. Moreover, US cities present enough
time-series variation to allow us to account for time-unvarying unobserved het-
erogeneity in the data, arguably a potential source of bias in cross-sectional
analysis. Second, the racial divide (mostly white/black historically, most re-
cently Whites/Blacks/Asians/Hispanics) has been a prominent feature of the
institutional debate and political choice in US cities10. Moreover, bloc-voting
within racial lines has empirical foundation. Third, the evolution of minority
”voting rights” and the Civil Rights movement in the sixties suggest a transfor-
mation of the nature of democratic institution in US cities. Before the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, African Americans in the South were largely disenfran-
chised, consequently the choice of electoral rules was rather irrelevant from a
race-relation point of view. From the mid-sixties onward white majorities had
to cope with black voters; therefore they had an incentive to adopt electoral
rules and forms of governments that minimized black inﬂuence. This episode
allows us additional robustness checks of our model of endogenous evolution
of electoral institutions. We begin with a brief review of the history of voting
rights in the South.
4.1 Legal and judicial interventions on voting in the United
States
There was no constitutional protection for voting and electoral participation in
the United States before the Civil War.11 African American individuals in state
of servitude were neither granted citizenship nor, consequently, voting rights.
After the war, during the Reconstruction (1867-1877), the Congress provided
such constitutional protection with the ratiﬁcation of the 14th Amendment in
1868 (conferring citizenship to all persons born or naturalized in the United
States) and the 15th Amendment in 1870 (providing that the right of vote
10US cities are not the only example of local politics inﬂuenced by race relations. For a
discussion of electoral rules and racial politics in elections in India see Pande (2003).
11We refer to the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section
for further details and reference for this section.
20should not be denied or abridged on the basis of race, color, or previous status
of servitude). The Enforcement Act (1870) and the Force Act (1871) ensured
additional legislative detail, among other things introducing federal oversight
over elections. Such measures eﬀectively induced an enlargement of the electoral
franchise to the black minority, both in the South and the rest of the country12.
Around 1872 more than three hundred Southern black legislators were holding
elected oﬃces.
However, after the 1877 compromise, following the election of the republi-
can Hayes, the demilitarization of the South and steadily up until 1910 with the
”Redemption”, Southern whites succeeded in reimposing pre-war political equi-
libria. The introduction of a series of legal procedures, color-blind on paper but
anti-black in practice, such as poll taxes, literacy tests, ”grandfather clauses”,
”understanding clauses”, vouchers of ”good character”, and disqualiﬁcation for
crimes of ”moral turpitude” achieved the substantial disenfranchisement of the
black minorities in the South. In addition, white majorities extensively enter-
tained the practice of ”white primaries”13. By the early 1900’s the number of
12All voters were white male according to the Naturalization Law of 1790.
Only with the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, which became law in 1920, women
obtained the right to vote in all elections. Constitutional amendment proposals for the ex-
tension of the electoral franchise to women had begun in 1878 and were proposed in every
session of the Congress for the following 40 years. Some States already had laws enabling
women to vote before 1920. Examples are Utah, Colorado, Idaho, and Wyoming, the ﬁrst
S t a t ei nt h eU n i o na l l o w i n gw o m e nt ov o t ei n1 8 9 0 .T h eS t a t e so fN e wY o r k ,M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,
New Hampshire, and New Jersey allowed women to vote at the end of the 18th century, but
between 1777 and 1807 they revoked those clauses.
Also Asian, Native American and Mexican individuals were not allowed to vote, not being
recognized as U.S. citizens. In 1924 Native Americans were granted citizenship and in 1948
the last state laws denying vote were overturned. Asians were able to obtain full citizenship
after the progressive overturning of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 completed in 1952.
13See Myrdal (1944) for a detailed account. According to Woodward (2002, p.85) ”the
state-wide Democratic primary was adopted in South Carolina in 1896, Arkansas in 1897,
Georgia in 1898, Florida and Tennessee in 1901, Alabama and Mississippi in 1902, Kentucky
and Texas in 1903, Louisiana in 1906, Oklahoma in 1907, Virginia in 1913, and North Carolina
in 1915.” Primaries were not open to racial minorities and were eﬀectively used to skim out
21Southern black legislators was back to zero: an early exempliﬁcation of the en-
dogeneity of political institutions to sudden shifts in the electoral franchise (see
Kousser, 1999). According to Woodward (2002) in Louisiana registered black
voters were 1,342 in 1904, down from a peak of 130,334 in 1896. This coin-
cided with the appearance of extensive Jim Crow legislation at the State level
in the South. Until the mid-sixties the number of Southern black legislators
remained close to zero. This coincided with a seemingly marginal role played
by the Supreme Court in the active defense of the 15th Amendment.14
It was only form the mid 1960’s that the Supreme Court started an active
monitoring of electoral participation provisions and apportionment of state leg-
islative districts. In Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962), the Court ruled against
malapportionment. In a series of cases (Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 US 1 (1964),
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965))
the Court ruled in the direction of re-equilibrating the weight of rural and urban
votes, favoring urban minorities, that is blacks. At the same time the federal
government started playing a much active role as well. President Lyndon John-
son ratiﬁed the 24th Amendment of the Constitution15 (1964) and signed into
law both the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act in 1965.
The goal of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is to remove strong obstacles
in voting registration procedures for racial minorities. Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act included a broad reassessment of the principles embedded in the 14th
and 15th Amendments. It deemed illegal the use of poll taxes, literacy tests, and
the requirement of ﬂuency in English for voting eligibility. Section 5 introduced
black voters, hence the appellation ”white primaries”.
14However, there were exceptions. In Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), the
Court ruled against a Oklahoma ”grandfather clauses” provision, in Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944), the Court ruled against Texas’ ”white primaries”, and in Gomillon v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the Supreme Court found unconstitutional the practice of
gerrymandering in the city of Tuskugee (Alabama).
15The amendment outlawed the poll tax in federal elections. Virginia ratiﬁed the amend-
ment in 1977, albeit the ratiﬁcation process was completed on January 23, 1964 (by 38 States).
The amendment was ratiﬁed by North Carolina in 1989. The amendment was rejected by the
State of Mississippi (and not subsequently ratiﬁed) in 1962.
22strict requirements of pre-clearance (by the District Court for the District of
Columbia or the U.S. Attorney General) of new voting procedures 16. The bill
authorized federal supervision of black voters’ registration in Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina (in 34 counties), South Carolina, and
Virginia (Woodward, 2002). In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966), the Supreme Court upheld the Constitutionality of the Act. In Allen
v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) pre-clearance conditions were
speciﬁed for a series of ”tests or devices” of minority vote dilution, including
explicitly changes to at-large elections from single district elections.
As a consequence of the Voting Rights Act, the number of registered minority
voters as a fraction of voting age population doubled and in some cases tripled in
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia between 1965 and 1988
(Grofman, Handley and Niemi, 1992). Amy (2002) reports that ”the number of
black elected oﬃcials in the United States grew an average 16.7 percent a year
between 1970 and 1977, from 1469 to 4311” (p.129). 17.
In the light of continuing racial polarization in 1970, 1975, and 1982 the
Congress introduced amendments to the Voting Rights Act extending Section
5 of 5, 7, and 25 years and addressing the removal of persistent obstacles to
eﬀective voting by the newly registered racial minorities (like gerrymander-
ing, annexations, at-large elections, multi-member districts, and other ”struc-
tural changes” to prevent blacks from voting through electoral dilution). The
Supreme Court followed suit, for example in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755
16Section 5 precisely indicates which political organizations are covered by the act through
identiﬁcation of speciﬁc parameters. States fully covered under the 1975 renewal of the Voting
Rights Act are Alabama, Alalska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina,
Texas, and Virginia. California, Florida New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota are only
partially covered in speciﬁc counties and Michigan and New Hampshire in speciﬁc townships.
See Data Appendix for details.
17In 1999 according to the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies the total number
of black elected oﬃcials was 5938 in the South (respectively 8936 in all U.S.), of which 340
were city mayors (resp. 450 nationwide), 2677 members of municipal governing bodies (resp.
3498 nationwide). There were no black senators in 1999 and 19 representatives form the South
(39 black representatives nationwide).
23(1973) and, with respect to dilution associated with at-large elections, in Thorn-
burg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). During the 1980’s and 1990’s the federal
government and the Supreme Court tended to diverge more frequently with re-
spect to aﬃrmative intervention in promoting minorities’ political enfranchise-
ment (particularly, with respect to aﬃrmative gerrymandering).18
From this brief historical excursus, we need to remember two points germane
to our empirical analysis:
1) Until the mid-sixties white majorities did not have to worry about black
vote in the South; only with the Voting Act of 1965 blacks were really a political
block vote to reckon with.
2) The implementation by the Courts of the Voting Rights Act also took
up the issues of the choice of electoral rules, precisely to avoid choices (like at
large elections) that would have favored the white majority. Thus, any attempt
of the white majority to engage in the kind of strategic choices implied by our
theoretical model would have to face potential challenges from the Courts.
4.2 Data and summary statistics
This section brieﬂy reviews the main variables employed in the empirical analy-
sis. We refer the reader to the Data Appendix19 for details on variables deﬁ-
nition, data construction and sources. We used two sets of data; one includes
18In 1980 the Supreme Court imposed the requirement of proof of ”racial discriminatory
purpose” in vote dilution cases (Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 1980). This was rectiﬁed by
a 1982 Congress Amendment, dispensing from such proof. The Supreme Court substantially
challenged ”aﬃrmative gerrymandering” in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) and Holden
v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994) among the others. Under President Bill Clinton the National
Voter Registration Act (also known popularly as the Motor Voter Act of 1993) aimed at
strongly promoting voter registration (for example, through the department of motor vehicles
structures, unemployment, and welfare bureaus). More recently the Help America Vote Act
of 2001 has shifted back to individual States most of the supervisory power over the quality
of electoral franchise. Voting Rights Acts renewal hearings are due in 2007.
19Due to space limitations we produce the Data Appendix in a separate document, available
on request. Please refer to the authors’ webpages for a downloadable version of the Data
Appendix.
24characteristics of city governments and their institutional details; the other in-
cludes demographic, economic, and geographic characteristics of US cities. We
collected information on US municipal governments characteristics for the pe-
riod 1930-2000, at decade intervals, from the Form of Government Survey and
Municipal Year Book by the International City/County Management Associa-
tion (ICMA) in Washington D.C. ICMA is a professional organization of city
managers and administrators publishing local government data since 1914 and
a well-recognized scholarly source. ICMA survey data have been employed in a
number of papers, including Baqir (2001), Sass and Pittman (2000), DeSantis
and Renner (1992) among the others. Data from 1980 onward are available in
electronic format; data before 1980 needed to be collected and entered from
hard copies. For this reason we decided to collect data before 1960 only for the
South, since it is in the South where the eﬀect of the Voting Rights Act is more
relevant and should show larger diﬀerences before and after the mid sixties.
From the various issues of the ICMA surveys we collected information on
electoral rules and forms of government for each municipality, including: council
size; number of district-awarded council seats; city form of government; num-
ber of councilmen belonging to diﬀerent racial groups currently sitting in the
council; mayor’s veto power over council resolutions; mayor’s vote restrictions in
council resolutions; mayor’s length of term in oﬃce; indicators of the presence of
referendum, initiative or recall. We then constructed two ”single district” vari-
ables: (i) SD, a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if all councilmen are elected
at large, 0 otherwise; (ii) y, continuously deﬁned as the fraction of councilmen
elected in single districts. We also constructed two ”form of government” in-
dexes increasing in the power of the executive. The ﬁrst index, indicated as
FOG, takes the value of 1 for mayor-council, 0 for council-manager and -1 for
Commission or Representative Town Meeting or Town Meeting. The second
index, indicated as SIND, is constructed as increasing function of provisions
strengthening the executive (like mayor-council and veto power) and decreasing
in provisions weakening the executive (for example, recall).20 With regard to
20The mayor-council form of government consists of an at-large elected mayor (the executive
25electoral rules in 2001 about 65.9 percent of the cities in the sample presented
only at-large-elected councilmen, about 14.8 percent presented only district-
elected councilmen. The remaining cities presented some combination of the
two types of rules, with councils consisting of a fraction of councilmen repre-
senting speciﬁc geographic areas and the others ”representing the whole city”.
From the decadal issues of the Bureau of the Census’ of Population we
collected information on total population, racial groups sizes, median income,
and geographic characteristics of Places and Minor Civil Divisions (MCD’s)21.
From 1930 to 1970, the data available allow for a breakdown into three groups:
white, black, and other races (we did not distinguish between foreign-born or
native). From 1980 the Census allows for a more reﬁned breakdown (in general
the breakdown includes at least Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, PaciﬁcI s -
landers, and Native Americans22). Since our empirical analysis runs from the
thirties to the nineties, for consistency we used the three group break down
(White, Blacks, others) for the entire sample. Our variable of interest was the
size of non-whites (we also reproduced all our result using blacks instead of
non whites, with virtually no changes in the results). ICMA and Census data
were subsequently merged on the basis of geographic identiﬁers and FIPS codes
(unique identiﬁers) whenever available or matched by city name and individually
checked. Details on the procedure are available in the Data Appendix.
A ﬁnal caveat. ICMA surveys present diﬀerent coverage depending on the
year. We review their representativeness in terms of population characteristics
vis-a-vis the corresponding entire Census population of places and MCD’s in
Appendix A. The bottom line is that sample of US cities collected by ICMA
branch) and a legislative branch, the council of councilmen (or aldermen), elected by ward,
at-large, or a mix of both rules. The mayor acts as chief executive oﬃcer of the city. Mayor’s
powers vis-a-vis the council vary within this typology of government. Typically we have two
variants, weak-mayor and strong-mayor..The council-manager form of government consists of
a legislative branch, the council, which selects and supervises a professional administrator, the
city manager. The manager is in charge of the implementation of the policy and day-to-day
municipal administration and can be removed or ﬁred by the council at will.
21Deﬁnitions and references in the Data Appendix.
22See Data Appendix.
26is representative of the total population of relatively large cities, above 2,500
inhabitants, and less representative of the full population of the Bureau of the
Census Places and Minor Civil Divisions (MCD’s). This is the reason why in
what follows, we always report results for the entire available sample and for
a subsample of cities above this threshold of 2,500; the results are in general
almost identical. We were also able to obtain the full lists of cities sampled from
ICMA for the last survey in year 2001 and we veriﬁed the absence any response
selection in the survey23. In the Data Appendix we report summary statistics
for the key variables of interest for the sample of all US cities and for the sample
of Southern cities. We now proceed to an empirical test of our model.
5 Empirical results
5.1 The choice of electoral rules
Empirical Strategy - Our main theoretical prediction is that the preference of
constitution writers for at-large over single-district increases and then decreases
with the initial size of the minority group.
We report a test of this hypothesis in Table 1. The empirical strategy that
we employ in this table and in the majority of the following ones is to stick to a
simple, yet ﬂexible, linear (in the coeﬃcients) parametric two-way panel model
in which we account for unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity at the city
level and for time-speciﬁce ﬀects. Proposition 1 hypothesizes a non-monotonic,
U−shaped relationship between either SD or y and π, which provides intuitive
appeal to the choice of ﬁtting a quadratic relationship between SD or y and
π24.F o r e a c h c i t y i in year t let us deﬁne the political variable of interest
yit (the fraction of councilmen elected by ward or district), the fraction of the
23See Appendix C.
24Further, simple non-parametric evidence is provided in what follows. A third-order poly-
nomial produced a very similar ﬁt as the quadratic model we report. The main diﬀerence
recurred for high levels of π, where the race of the charter writers could be non-white. Higher-
order polinomials produced a worse ﬁt than the quadratic.
27minorities25, πit, am a t r i xo f(k x 1) controls Xit and the two-way error as
uit = αi + δt + ηit. We specify26 the following:
yit = β0 + πitβ1 +( πit)
2 β2 + X0
itγ + αi + δt + ηit (7)
for i =1 ,...,N and t =1 ,...,T .
Controlling for city-speciﬁc unobserved characteristics is relevant to our em-
pirical strategy. Historical, geographical, and cultural conditions explain much
of the variation in political institutions at the city cross-sectional level (about 67
percent). However, such conditions are often diﬃcult to measure directly and
would bias, if omitted, any inference concerning the role of changes of racial
composition of the city in the choice of electoral rules. Employing within-city
variation allows us to account for such unobserved heterogeneity and estimate
consistently the vector (β1,β2). Time-speciﬁce ﬀects are similarly useful in ac-
counting for across-the-board eﬀects, such as federal legislation, that again need
to be controlled for, especially in the post-1965 period27 when indeed legislation
was extremely active. We address the issue of serial correlation in the error
component η by relaxing the assumption of independence and clustering at the
city level. Conditional heteroskedasticity of unknown type is also accounted for.
Identiﬁcation of (7) is also particularly relevant. The most likely source of
reverse causation aﬀecting (7) is endogenous sorting across municipalities driven
by more favorable electoral rules. Minority voters may move towards cities
with better chances of representation or white voters may move out of cities
with excess minority representation. Hence, Tiebout sorting would predict a
correlation between changes in city racial composition and in electoral rules of
the opposite sign to what predicted by our model. Speciﬁcally, suppose that
25Notice that the theoretical restriction π<0.5 is satisﬁed in the data, as more than 90
percent of cities are below π =0 .361 for the whole sample of American cities and below
π =0 .433 for the South.
26T h es a m es p e c i ﬁcation is also employed for SD. H o w e v e ri nt h a tc a s ew ea s s u m eal o g i s t i c
distribution of η.
27Formal F-tests for this speciﬁcation support the use of a two-way setup. Both groups of
ﬁxed eﬀects are jointly signiﬁcant in every speciﬁcation.
28a city changes its electoral rule in favor of white voters against black voters,
then the percentage of the latter should go down because of Tiebout sorting
(and possibly the white group should increase in number reducing the fraction
of blacks even further). Instead, we show below that, as the share of blacks
increases, electoral rules turn against them. In this light the estimates presented
below need to be interpreted as lower bounds of the eﬀects the theory predicts.
A ﬁnal issue on the empirical strategy concerns the timing of the Voting
Rights Act. Table 1 is divided in two parts: for the period before and after the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.28 The ﬁrst year for which complete survey data from
ICMA are available after 1965 on electoral rules (and forms of government) is
1967, which we take as the dividing line for pre- and post-Voting Rights Act
and we match to the 1970 Census data. The non-monotonic relation should
e m e r g eo n l yi nc a s eo fa ne n f r a n c h i s e dm i n o r i t y . F r o mt h et i m eo fi t si n t r o -
duction, the Voting Rights Act represented a sudden extension of the political
franchise to blacks. We employ such date as an informative source of variation
for institutional manipulation, particularly in Southern cities.
Results - The ﬁrst four columns of Table 1 refer to the sample of Southern
cities29. Column (1) shows the basic speciﬁcation including all cities. Column
(2) focuses on cities above the 2,500 threshold (remember the ICMA sample is
more representative for cities above this size) columns (3)-(4) include additional
controls for city size, median income, and a deterministic time trend at the State
level. The last two columns show the same regressions for the sample of all US
cities.
The model calls for a negative linear and a positive quadratic term on the
28Note that one may want to exclude cities in which whites are a minority. There are very
f e wo ft h o s ea n di na d d i t i o ne v e nw h e nw h i t e sa r eam i n o r i t yi nt e r m so fn u m b e ro fi n h a b i t a n t s ,
demographic factors and vote participation patterns may still make them a majority as active
voters (see Amy 1993, p.125 for an example). For this reason it is unclear which cities to drop
from the sample. We tried a few experiments and our results appear robust.
29As for all the rest of our empirical analysis we exclude from the sample those cities for
which we have information that the change of structure of government is the result of court
mandate or State Law. ICMA data provide partial information with this respect.
29share of the non-white minority; as this share increases, at-large elections be-
come more desirable up to a point in which the voting minority is so large that
the majority is better oﬀ by "packing" minority votes through single-district
elections. The signs of the coeﬃcients are consistent with this story. Looking
for instance at column (1) the estimated coeﬃcients imply that this U− shaped
curve reaches a minimum at about 29.2 percent (0.292 = 0.885/3.028) non-white
minority. (Note that 66.7 percent of the sampled cities in year 2000 were below
this level). The last two columns show that when we look at the US as a whole,
the sign of the coeﬃc i e n t si st h es a m ea st h a tf o rt h eS o u t h ,b u tt h es i z eo ft h e
coeﬃcient is smaller in absolute value, roughly half, suggesting that these racial
eﬀects are stronger in the South. To gauge quantitatively the size of the two
eﬀects, one can start observing the empirical distribution of the size of minori-
ties in Southern cities. Consider as a benchmark the cross-sectional distribution
of minority sizes in year 2000 (but likewise for all the decades 1970-1990) for
those cities employed in the column (1) sample. The ﬁrst quartile (Q1) for the
fraction of minority is 9.76 percent and the third quartile (Q3) is 34.86. At Q1,
given estimated coeﬃcients in column (1) of -0.885 and 1.514 (with clustered
standard errors respectively 0.308 and 0.475), an increase of one standard de-
viation of minority sizes (16 percent) implies a reduction of -5.56 percentage
points (-0.0556 = -0.885*0.16+ 1.514*(0.2576^2-0.0976^2)) of the fraction of
single-district seats. This is equivalent to about one seat switching from single-
district to at-large in a council of 18 seats. At Q3, the same increase of one
standard deviation would instead produce an increase of about +6.6 percentage
points in the fraction of single-district seats. This would be equivalent to about
one seat switching from at-large to single-district in a council of 15 seats. These
two estimates appear quantitatively reasonable. In order to evaluate the size of
these eﬀects one has to remember that the Voting Rights Act itself imposed lim-
its on how much cities could switch to AL systems!30 In other words, without
Supreme Court involvement, these eﬀects would have been surely larger, even
if possibly not as large as the disenfranchisement of the 1877-1900.
30See below for further details.
30The bottom panel shows regression for the Sample of Southern cities before
the Voting Rights Act, for the period 1930-197031. Here the coeﬃcients on the
size of the minority and its square are statistically zero. This is consistent with
our hypothesis that before the Voting Act electoral rules were unaﬀected by the
city racial composition, since racial minorities (blacks) were almost completely
disenfranchised.
Table 2 presents estimates employing a discrete dependent variable, SD,and
a conditional logistic estimator grouping observations at the city level. This is
corresponds to what part of the applied literature calls ﬁxed eﬀects (or condi-
tional) logit model. The implications of Table 1 carry over to this speciﬁcation
check consistently with the predictions of Proposition 1. Given that the likeli-
hood contributions of cities which do not change their electoral rule are zero,
one observes a smaller number of observations than in Table 1. For what follows
we prefer to limit ourselves to the analysis of the continuous variable y given
the greater ﬂexibility allowed by the continuity of the dependent variable.
Time persistence is an important characteristic of political systems, there-
fore we employ a standard dynamic panel technique, through ﬁrst diﬀerencing
and application of the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator, in Table 3.
This procedure has the double advantage of enriching our basic speciﬁcation
of a dynamic component and addressing the issue of endogeneity of size of the
minority through the use of lags of the exogenous variables (the time ﬁxed ef-
fects), endogenous variables (city population and fraction of the minority), and
the dependent variable. The speciﬁcation we employ is:
yit = yit−1θ + β0 + πitβ1 +( πit)
2 β2 + X0
itγ + αi + δt + ηit.
Together with a signiﬁcant autoregressive component (θ around 0.3 in column
(1), panel a) the ﬁrst three columns show the same patterns of coeﬃcients on
31The panel observation we indicate as 1970 indeed employs information on 1967 ICMA
data, matched with 1970 Census demographic variables. We also repeated all the analysis
matching the Census with the 1972 ICMA data with very similar results. We opted for 1967
because of better coverage and vicinity to 1965, the actual date of enactment of the bill.
31the share of minority variable as Table 1. The minimum in this U curve is
reached at a fraction of the minority of about 33.8 percent. The coeﬃcients
β1 and β2 for the size of the minority are in the same order of magnitude of
our previous results in Table 1, but about two times larger (β1 = −1.644 and
β2 =2 .645 in column (1) with one-step robust standard error respectively 0.712
and 1.002). Quantitatively a stronger result, this would imply a change of 1 seat
from single-district to at-large in a council of 9 at Q1 (about -11.27 percentage
points) and a change of 1 seat from at-large to single-district in a council of
10 at Q3 (about +9.97 percentage points). Again we also ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
role for racial composition in the pre-Voting Rights South (panel b). Finally, we
need to note that due to the lag requirements of the model we ﬁnd ourselves
conﬁned to a smaller sample (especially for the all US sample: it does not go
further back than 1980, so we can employ at most one lagged diﬀerence).
The speciﬁcation checks for the dynamic model are reported at the bottom
of each panel of Table 3. For Columns (1) and (2) the second order serial
correlation p-values of the one-step procedure does not to rise concerns over the
validity of the instrument set, but the overidentiﬁcation test’s p-value obtained
from the GMM two-step procedure seems low (although not granting rejection
at any conﬁdence level for the South and not at 5 percent for all US) given the
low-power properties of such tests. However, additional robustness checks and
the consistency of the standard linear model and this simple dynamic extension
are source of reassurance.
5.2 Additional nonparametric evidence on the choice of
rules
Simple nonparametric evidence supports the main prediction of the model as
well. We expect to observe two basic regularities concerning the within variation
in the data. First, the slope of a within regression of the single-district variable
on the fraction of the minority (or the fraction of blacks) should be increasing
in subsamples where the average minority size is increasingly higher. Second,
32we would expect statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of negative sign to appear
at relatively small values of the fraction of the minority (where the downward-
bending part of the U−shaped parabola is steeper) and statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients of positive sign to appear at relatively large values of the fraction
of the minority (where the upward-bending part of the U−shaped parabola
is steeper). A ﬂat and insigniﬁcant relationship should appear in the middle
range. We borrow a simple modiﬁcation of locally weighted scatterplot smooth-
ing (lowess) from Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) and run a series of within-city
regressions in the relevant interval of minority sizes π ∈ [0.05,0.55] employing
a symmetric bandwidth of half a cross-sectional standard deviation of minority
size (17/2=8 .5 percent). Again we focus on the South of the United States
for the period post- and pre-1967. Speciﬁcally for each subsample we estimate:
yit = β0 + πitβ1 + αi + δt + ηit.
At increments of 1/5 of a percentage point of minority fraction (i.e. 0.002)w e
register the within-city slope (β1) and its t-statistic. We then regress the esti-
mated slopes and the t-statistics against the corresponding mid-sample fraction
of the minority. In both regressions a positive coeﬃcient on the mid-sample frac-
tion of the minority would conﬁrm each of the two hypotheses discussed above.
Table 4 reports results for both post- and pre-1967 for nonwhite minorities and
conﬁrms our predictions.
As expected, coeﬃcients move from being prevalently negative at low levels
of π32 to being prevalently positive at higher levels of π (around 1/2). Over the
interval33 π ∈ [0.05,0.22] the average coeﬃcient for nonwhites in the post-1967
South is equal to −0.601 and gives an estimate that is larger but comparable
to the eﬀect of the parametric estimate at Q1 (for an increase of 17 percent the
change in single-district is −0.102 versus −0.0556 of the F.E. parametric model
32Notice that ﬂats at low values of π are justiﬁed by the relative equivalence of at-large and
single-district rules in cases where minorities would not gain representation under any of the
two rules.
33Bounds for the intervals of π are chosen to divide in three equal parts the support for the
downward, ﬂat, and upward part of the curve.
33and −0.1127 of the dynamic panel); the same holds for the average coeﬃcient
in the interval π ∈ [0.38,0.55] (β1 =0 .857) comparable to the parametric eﬀect
at Q3 (0.145 versus 0.0660 in the F.E. model and 0.0997 in the dynamic panel).
A within regression in such small subsamples (due to the small bandwidth)
is demanding but nonetheless the main nonlinearity is detectable. However,
we detect large ﬂuctuations in the coeﬃcients due to the varying (and small)
number of changes in electoral rules in each subsample. We observe relatively
larger (in absolute value) t-statistics mostly around the extrema of the interval
of minority sizes (negative at low levels of π and positive at large levels of π)
and generally insigniﬁcant results otherwise.
5.3 Electoral rules and minority representation
Our basic story holds that electoral rules aﬀect the ratio of minorities elected
diﬀerently. This is the reason why the constitution writers choose diﬀerently in
the ﬁrst place. The ratio of non-white council members should display depen-
dence on the electoral rules in order for the fundamental tenet of our analysis
to be veriﬁed. Moreover, diﬀerent rules should have diﬀerent eﬀects on minor-
ity representation at diﬀerent minority sizes. By quantitatively estimating the
impact of electoral rules on minority representation, we provide evidence that
both statements are veriﬁed by the data and that the estimated eﬀects move in
the direction our model presumes and rationalizes.
The representational ratio is the fraction of minority councilmen in a council
divided by the fraction of the population that belongs to the minority and is
available for our all-US cities sample in year 1980, 1990, and 2000.34 A large
section of empirical Political Scientists have employed the representational ratio
as the typical measures of the degree of ”proportionality” of an electoral system
(i.e. if composition of population racial group maps one-to-one into the racial
34Very few cities for the all US sample present representational ratios of minorities of more
than 1, indicating over-proportional representation. Even less of them are present in the
South. In order to limit the role of these outliers we limit the representational ratio to be less
than 5.
34composition of the legislative body). We regress it on our variable of interests,
the single-district rule variable. Table 5 reports the results. The null hypothesis
that the electoral rule adopted by a city has no association with the represen-
tational ratio is soundly rejected in both a pooled cross-sectional regressions
(Panel a) and in ﬁxed-eﬀect regressions in which time invariant city-speciﬁc
unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for (Panel b). All speciﬁcations include
year ﬁxed eﬀects and a set of standard controls for city size (log population) and
income levels (log household median income in 1990 dollars) and we apply the
same clustering as Table 1. Looking at columns (1) and (2) for the South and
(3) for the whole country, single-district rules substantially increase the chance
of minorities to be proportionally represented at the municipal level. Recalling
that the fraction of single-district seats, y, is deﬁned over the [0,1] interval, our
results in column (1) imply an average increase of the representational ratio of
the city council between 13 (in panel a) and 35.4 (in panel b) percentage points
from switching from a fully at-large rule to a fully single-district rule35.T h i si sa
quantitatively substantial eﬀect: each black or minority vote has something less
than 1/3 more weight in terms of electoral representation under single-district
than under at-large elections. Both our cross-sectional and ﬁxed-eﬀect analysis
provide quantitatively similar evidence and, as one would expect, such results
are quantitatively stronger in the more segregated South.
In columns (4)-(7) we provide evidence that the impact of the single-district
rule on the representational ratio is actually non-monotonic in the size of the
minority by including an interaction of the single-district variable and the frac-
tion of non-whites (the level of non-whites is included as well). At low levels
of minority size both at-large and single-district should be indistinguishable in
warranting representation: minority are just too small to achieve representation
under any rule. However, as the minority size increases single-district will oﬀer
better chances of representation to geographically segregated minorities vis-a-
35Virtually identical results are obtained when we deﬁne the left hand side as fraction of
non white concilpersons over the fraction of non white population. We use speciﬁcally the
black group in order to make our results more comparable with the previous literature.
35vis at-large. Such eﬀect will diminish, however, when the minority becomes so
large that some district votes (those beyond simple majority in the district) will
be wasted. This implies that the sign of the coeﬃcient should be negative on
the interaction term. In panel a) columns (4)-(7) present interactions with the
predicted sign that are signiﬁcant at standard conﬁdence levels and reject the
absence of a non-monotonicity. Moreover, single-district maintains his expected
positive eﬀect, while the fraction of minority has a positive coeﬃcient. The
picture in the ﬁxed eﬀect analysis in panel b) is less clear, primarily because the
required variation in the data is a contemporaneous change over three dimen-
sions: electoral rules, fraction of minorities, and number of minority councilmen.
Albeit our data set is rich, this requirement is probably too stringent.
We are not the ﬁrst to observe that at-large election favors the white ma-
jority and our results are consistent with a substantial body of Political Science
literature on the matter. For instance Amy (2002) writes that ”the system of
voting in at large elections often makes it virtually impossible for minority can-
didates to get elected. At-large elections require candidates to get a majority
or plurality of the vote to win, which usually allows a white majority to take
all seats and to deny minorities any representation at all.” (p. 150) 36.S a s s
and Pittman (2000) also provide panel data evidence on the eﬀect of electoral
rule on minority representation reporting a representational ratio diﬀerential of
36 percent, quite comparable with our linear estimates. Our results extend to
more recent data and a substantially larger sample of cities. We are not aware
of previous empirical study pointing at the non-monotonicity in the eﬀect of
single-district rules on minority representation.
5.4 The Voting Rights Act and electoral rules
This section investigate further how the Voting Rights Act imposes a constraint
on the constitutional choice of the white majorities. The Voting Rights Act not
36For similar views see Berry and Dye (1987). For empirical cross-sectional analysis see
Karning and Welch (1982), also cited in Amy (2002).
36only removes (and has removed) obstacles to minority voting registration. Any
jurisdiction covered under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act has the duty of
obtaining pre-clearance for any change concerning voting from the oﬃce of the
Attorney General through the Department of Justice or United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Every change proposed is individually re-
viewed from the Department of Justice and cleared37 "if the change does not
lead to a retrogression in the position of minority voters with respect to the ef-
fective exercise of the electoral franchise”. Case by case clearance is based on
the study of the most recent Census and electoral data available and through
interviews to concerned parties.
The implementation (both by Law and through the Courts) of the Voting
Rights Act has been extremely successful, but it is hard to presume it has been
perfect and deﬁnitive. The very fact that the VRA has been repeatedly renewed
over time indicates that pressures towards distortion of voting institutions are
still present and perceivable (the VRA is due for renewal in 2007). Riker (1984)
brilliant account of a camouﬂaged litigation in a council-manager redistricting
dispute (albeit in a diﬀerent legal context) shows an example of how political
institutions may still be distorted in favor of an incumbent majority even in
such situations. We believe our analysis detects such pressure in the form of
systematic strategic changes in electoral rules under the current legal constraint.
The estimated dimension of the changes detected seems not so large to lead to a
severe under-representation of blacks. Severe under-representation would raise
legal highbrows and court challenges and, ultimately, legally-imposed changes
in the electoral rule (which we exclude from our analysis).
There is also some evidence that the Voting Rights Legislation is progres-
sively more eﬀective in detecting strategic electoral manipulation. Table 6 re-
ports median values for ethnic fragmentation, fraction of blacks and fraction of
non-white minority. For the seventies both for the set of fully- and partially-
covered States in the South, median minority sizes of cities increased in the vari-
37Information concerning objected changes can be found in the motivation letters available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/obj_activ.htm.
37able of single-district rule are substantially higher and well outside conﬁdence
intervals of medians of cities decreasing single-district, in a direction consistent
with a degree of manipulation. However, in the eighties the diﬀerence in the
medians is reduced and gets substantially smaller in the nineties.
Finally, the coverage on the Voting Act is endogenous: the loci of greater
potential conﬂict are those to which the VRA applies in full coverage. They are
also the ones where the eﬀects we detect are clearer. Table 7 reproduces the
post- Voting Rights result of Tables 1 and 3 for those cities belonging to fully
VRA-covered States and shows, especially for the basic panel model, greater
signiﬁcance and quantitatively larger coeﬃcients. In column (2), panel a), the
linear coeﬃcient increases of about 48 percent, the quadratic 18 percent vis-a-vis
the benchmark reported in column (1).
5.5 Form of government
For given council composition, there is anecdotal evidence that the form of gov-
ernment may play a role as well in the enfranchisement of minorities. The two
main forms, mayor-council and council-manager, diﬀer with respect to the role
of the mayor as the pivot of the executive (stronger in the ﬁrst instance). Our
model is not centered on the role of form of government38 but in this section we
brieﬂy review empirical evidence which may be per se relevant. In cities where
the white voters hold a solid majority and are almost sure of electing a white
mayor, they may have prefer a strong mayor form of government. On the other
hand, in cities with a closer ﬁfty-ﬁfty split, the white constitutional writers may
prefer a council-manager form of government to avoid the risk of ending with
a black strong mayor. The following quote from an editorial from a newspaper
targeted to Hispanics in San Diego (La Prensa, April 24, 2004) is an example of
how form of government may enter the picture. In discussing proposed changes
in the charter of the city of San Diego, the editorial concludes that ”F o rH i s -
panics having a strong mayor form of government does not bode.... well for this
38See our discussion in the extensions of the basic model.
38community. Putting so much power into one person’s hands....translates into
control by Republican right wings. Regardless of the changing demographics, i.e.
the continual growth of the Hispanic, Asian, Filipino, black community political
representation in the city of San Diego will be held by a diminishing number
of white ...citizens.” A relatively weak council hardly exercises any eﬀective
check on executive powers. A powerful council plays exactly the opposite role
in council-manager structures.
We start considering two indexes of form of government, FOGand SIND,
increasing in the degree of executive power. A strong mayor could be preferred
by the charter writers as long as their position as majority of the city is strong,
but a strong mayor is relatively riskier whenever minorities are large enough.
At that point the more collegial council-manager form could be employed (given
that whites could still be able to seat in the council). Therefore, to be congruent
with our results on electoral rule, we would expect a positive coeﬃcient on the
size of the minority and perhaps a negative quadratic term in a regression where
form of government is the dependent variable. Table 8 is organized as Table 1,
a two-way panel model, while Table 9 mirrors Table 3, a dynamic panel model.
Both Tables employ FOGas dependent variable. Table 10 instead presents the
static panel model for SIND39.
These Tables suggest a blurred picture. The coeﬃcient of size of the minor-
ity in the post-1967 sample has the expected sign only in a limited subset of
regressions in Table 10, but never in Tables 8 and 9. Moreover, the coeﬃcient on
ethnic fractionalization is not statistically signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations for
the South (or it is at 10 percent, but with the wrong sign). This same coeﬃcient
is insigniﬁcant (in fact very close to zero and switching sign) in the pre-1967
sample. The explanation for the wrong signs has often to do with the correlation
between form of government and electoral rule (council-manager forms tend to
employ at-large elections). Surely, further analysis of this issue (especially the
institutional complementarity between form of government and electoral rule)
39The lack of pre-1980 observations for most components of SIND limit our analysis to the
simple static model.
39is necessary, but on a ﬁrst approximation it would appear that electoral rules
more than forms of government respond to the racial composition of a city. Not
surprisingly perhaps: electoral rules are the intuitive ﬁrst line of defense against
extensions of the democratic franchise.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Electoral rules are endogenous and evolve relatively quickly in response to chang-
ing underlying conditions. Minority representation depends on the ability of a
majority bloc to adapt institutions to changing conditions and guaranteeing
its supremacy. The experience of voting rights and electoral institutions in
US cities, particularly in the South, is illuminating. Before the Voting Rights
Acts of 1965, racial minorities were essentially disenfranchised in the US South.
Therefore, the type of electoral institutions were irrelevant in determining the
level of control of the white majority: a level of control that was almost absolute.
The Voting Rights Act allowed racial minorities to enter into the political arena.
The white majorities reacted, within the legal boundaries of the Voting Rights
Act, by changing electoral rules as to minimize expected minority inﬂuence.
This evidence suggests how institutions (in this case electoral rules) evolve
even rather quickly in response to changes in the environment and raises ques-
tions about empirical evidence that holds electoral institutions as exogenous.
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7 Appendix: Sample selection
In this section we aim at inspecting mayor selection issues regarding the sample
of municipalities employed in the main analysis (the ICMA respondents sample).
First, we inspect diﬀerences in the distribution of population and economic
covariates between the main sample (all US and South municipalities) employed
in the analysis (that is the ICMA respondents sample) and the whole U.S.
Census of population sample for the 1980-2000 period. This comparison is
ﬁnalized at qualitatively assessing how representative is our sample of the whole
population of U.S. municipalities. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the moments of the
44distributions of the covariates would indicate non-random sampling from the
underlying population of U.S. municipalities.
Second, we compare population and economic covariates between the main
sample (all US and South) employed in the analysis and the universe of cities
to which the ICMA initially mailed the survey in year 2000. This compari-
son is ﬁnalized at assessing self-selection of the respondents. Signiﬁcant dif-
ferences in the moments of the distributions of the covariates would indicate
non-randomness of non-response patterns.
Third, sample selection is also investigated for the years 1930-1970, but
limited to States in the South.
Table (AI) presents qualitative evidence of sample selection. The ICMA
sample covers 13 percent of municipalities reported in the U.S. Census of Popu-
lation for 1980, 11 percent in 1990, and 8 percent in year 2000. ICMA respondent
municipalities tend to be more ethnically divided, larger in terms of total popu-
lation, and richer in terms of median income at the city level. All two-sample t
tests of diﬀerence in the means across the whole Census and ICMA samples for
each covariate reject equality in means signiﬁcantly (below 1 percent conﬁdence
level40).
One reason for selection arises naturally from ICMA sample construction
strategy. Municipalities included in the U.S. Census above 2500 population are
included in the ICMA survey ”universe” (Municipal Year Book, 2003). Of those
below 2500 population, only municipalities aﬃliated to ICMA are included. For
sample year 2000 ICMA respondent municipalities below 2500 amount to about
11 percent of the whole sample (376 municipalities out of a total 4193). Similar
proportions are found in the 1980 and 1990 samples.
Unfortunately, such explanations do not account for selection completely.
Even considering the Census and ICMA sub-samples with population above
40Both year by year and pooled two-sample t test for diﬀerence in means were run, for a total
of twelve tests (3 years: 1980-1990-2000 plus the pooled sample times 3 covariates: ethnic,
pop, income). We allow for unequal variances across sub-samples. All tests are available from
the authors.
452500 and comparing the two sub-samples, signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the mean of
the covariates do not disappear in some cases (population size).
Table (AII) presents little evidence of response selection for the sample of
non-respondents and respondents in the 2001 ICMA Municipal Form of Govern-
ment Survey. The choice of the year is dictated by the fact that ICMA maintains
historical record of the whole list of municipalities in their ”universe” for their
1996 and 2001 Form of Government surveys only. There was no corresponding
equivalent list of surveyed municipalities for 1981 and 1991.
The percentage of responses received in 2001 for which data is about 54 per-
cent, a measure conforming to previous survey’s response rates as well. ICMA
respondent and non-respondent municipalities tend to be equally ethnically di-
vided and to have the same total population. Two-sample t tests for diﬀerences
in means reject the hypothesis of equality at standard conﬁdence levels (1, 5, and
10 percent). However, median income of ICMA non-respondent municipalities
is lower than income of respondents in a statistically signiﬁcant fashion. One
possible explanation could be the availability of more administrative resources
in relatively richer communities, allowing for more eﬀective handling of survey
response and similar incidental administrative tasks.
Table (AIII) reports summary statistics for both the (matched) ICMA sam-
ple obtained from the ICMA Municipal Year Book (various years) and whole
Census sample for the period 1930-1970. Data for this period were collected
only for cities in the South (see Data Appendix for detailed data sources).
Again as for the 1980-2000 samples reported in Table (AI) the sampling
strategy adopted by the ICMA (and feasibility issues) presents statistically sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerence from the Census samples. ICMA selects larger (and therefore
more fragmented) and richer cities for its analysis (see details on samples sizes
in the Data Appendix). Again, t tests for diﬀerences in means provide formal
support to the inspection of Table (AIII).
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2500 South South All U.S. All U.S.
Panel (a): Post 1967
Dependent variable: Fraction of councilmen elected by district
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Frac. Minority -0.885 -0.943 -0.877 -0.818 -0.565 -0.453
[0.308]*** [0.313]*** [0.308]*** [0.325]** [0.198]*** [0.195]**
(Frac. Minority)^2 1.514 1.819 1.532 1.385 0.964 0.777
[0.475]*** [0.491]*** [0.478]*** [0.462]*** [0.279]*** [0.263]***
Log(City Population) 0.002 0.015 -0.007 -0.017 0.013 -0.003
[0.038] [0.039] [0.041] [0.043] [0.023] [0.025]
Log(Median Income) 0.056 0.022 0.011
[0.093] [0.100] [0.054]
State trend Included Included
Observations 4011 3723 4010 4010 12413 12412
Number of cities 1914 1746 1914 1914 6526 6526
R-squared 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.84 0.86
Panel (b): Pre 1967
Dependent variable: Fraction of councilmen elected by district
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Frac. Minority 0.421 0.584 1.233 1.136
[0.548] [0.858] [1.287] [1.276]
(Frac. Minority)^2 -0.439 -0.754 -1.722 -1.958
[0.638] [1.385] [1.932] [1.941]
Log(City Population) 0.017 0.021 0.084 0.095
[0.041] [0.041] [0.058] [0.060]
Log(Median Income) -0.113 -0.058
[0.065]* [0.061]
State trend Included
Observations 2388 2382 2041 2041
Number of cities 968 964 966 966
R-squared 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.76
Notes: Standard errors in brackets below coefficients. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. In panel (a) and  (b) standard errors are clustered at the city level. 
All regressions include year fixed effects. Panel (a) covers the period 1970-2000. Panel (b) 
covers the period 1930-1970. Table II














2500 South South All U.S.
Panel (a): Post 1967
Dependent variable: Single district elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Frac. Minority -11.422 -11.604 -11.288 -5.184 -8.476
[3.459]*** [3.503]*** [3.458]*** [4.890] [2.674]***
(Frac. Minority)^2 23.753 24.318 23.842 19.253 18.359
[5.574]*** [5.660]*** [5.574]*** [7.481]** [4.214]***
Log(City Population) 0.486 0.491 0.389 0.016 0.193
[0.430] [0.437] [0.436] [0.626] [0.289]
Log(Median Income) 0.778 0.695
[0.933] [1.335]
State trend Included
Observations 641 620 641 641 1305
Number of cities 214 205 214 214 493
Panel (b): Pre 1967
Dependent variable: Single district elections
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Frac. Minority 10.805 10.805 10.345 11.631
[6.815] [6.815] [7.416] [9.969]
(Frac. Minority)^2 -12.233 -12.233 -12.177 -19.614
[10.265] [10.265] [10.992] [14.690]
Log(City Population) -0.068 -0.068 0.453 0.865
[0.422] [0.422] [0.501] [0.772]
Log(Median Income) -1.753 -1.698
[0.967]* [1.407]
State trend
Observations 529 529 404 404
Number of cities 163 163 147 147
Notes: Standard errors in brackets below coefficients. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include year fixed 
effects. Panel (a) covers the period 1970-2000. Panel (b) covers the period 
1930-1970. Table III














Panel (a): Post 1967
Dependent variable: Fraction of councilmen elected by district
(1) (2) (3)
Lag Single District 0.313 0.311 0.29
[0.056]*** [0.055]*** [0.057]***
Frac. Minority -1.644 -1.654 -2.113
[0.712]** [0.724]** [0.635]***
(Frac. Minority)^2 2.649 2.822 1.838
[1.002]*** [0.972]*** [0.706]***
Log(City Population) -0.342 -0.33 -0.538
[0.258] [0.275] [0.236]**
Second Order Serial Correlation p-
value  0.140 0.140 0.196
J test p-value 0.123 0.160 0.021
Observations 1506 1489 2508
Number of cities 797 782 1799
Panel (b): Pre 1967
Dependent variable: Fraction of councilmen elected by district
(1) (2)
Lag Single District 0.751 0.751
[0.109]*** [0.109]***
Frac. Minority 1.829 1.829
[5.259] [5.259]
(Frac. Minority)^2 -3.634 -3.634
[7.928] [7.928]
Log(City Population) 0.272 0.272
[0.319] [0.319]
Second Order Serial Correlation p-
value  0.07 0.07
J test p-value 0.997 0.997
Observations 891 891
Number of cities 462 462
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets below coefficients. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Lag 
Single District is the the first lag of the dependent variable. All 
regressions include year fixed effects. Panel (a) covers the period 
1970-2000. Panel (b) covers the period 1930-1970. Both ethnic 
fractionalization and population are treated as endogenous variables. 
The maximum number of lags used for instrumenting them is 2. Table IV
Change in slope and t-stat of local 
within regressions of single-district 
on fraction of minority (π) over the 








pre 1967 0.165 0.897
[0.353] [0.926]
Notes: Column (1) reports coefficients 
and standard errors corresponding to 
regression of locally estimated 
coefficients of single-district on fraction 
of minority on the corresponding mid-
sample fraction of minority. Column (2) 
employs the corresponding t-statistic. 
Robust standard errors are in brackets 
below coefficients. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. Regressions include a constant 
(not reported). See text for local 
sample details.Table V












Dependent variable: Representaional ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Single-District 0.13 0.125 0.015 0.205 0.169 0.173 0.299
[0.041]*** [0.043]*** [0.018] [0.067]*** [0.068]** [0.071]** [0.069]***
(Single-Distr. * Frac. Min.) -0.333 -0.289 -0.315 -0.38
[0.159]** [0.157]* [0.167]* [0.163]**
Frac. Minority 0.802 0.586 0.533 0.824
[0.077]*** [0.081]*** [0.091]*** [0.066]***
Log(City Population) 0.106 0.117 0.102 0.08 0.096 0.108 0.072
[0.015]*** [0.016]*** [0.007]*** [0.014]*** [0.015]*** [0.017]*** [0.012]***
Log(Median Income) -0.362 -0.45 -0.338 -0.254 -0.352
[0.062]*** [0.064]*** [0.021]*** [0.068]*** [0.072]***
Observations 3039 2767 11113 3039 3039 2767 2875
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09
Panel (b): City Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: Representaional ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Single-District 0.354 0.377 0.204 0.298 0.297 0.36 0.221
[0.091]*** [0.081]*** [0.061]*** [0.196] [0.196] [0.174]** [0.163]
(Single-Distr. * Frac. Min.) 0.211 0.212 0.063 0.385
[0.472] [0.472] [0.436] [0.420]
Frac. Minority -0.643 -0.579 -0.626 -0.568
[0.380]* [0.380] [0.436] [0.354]
Log(City Population) -0.006 0.012 0.072 0.033 0.013 0.04 0.012
[0.097] [0.114] [0.070] [0.096] [0.099] [0.118] [0.103]
Log(Median Income) 0.215 0.214 0.000 0.124 0.107
[0.182] [0.202] [0.110] [0.183] [0.207]
Observations 3039 2767 11113 3039 3039 2767 2875
Number of cities 1642 1482 6158 1642 1642 1482 1570
R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.71 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.69
Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets below coefficients. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. All regressions include year fixed effects. 
Sample coverage: period 1980-2000. The representational ratio is the fraction of non-white (black in column 
7 of both panels) councilmen in the council divided by the fraction of the population that is non-white (black 
in column 7).Table VI: Characteristics of Cities Changing Electoral Rule Under Voting Rights Act Preclearance Condition (by 
decade)
Period 1970-1980
Voting Rights Act - South States fully covered Voting Rights Act - All South States with some  coverage
Subsample Decreasing SINGLE DISTRICT Subsample Decreasing SINGLE DISTRICT
-- Binom. Interp. -- -- Binom. Interp. --
Variable Obs Median [95% Conf. Interval] Variable Obs Median [95% Conf. Interval]
Ethnic(t-10)  21 0.166378 .0693809    .3390113 Ethnic(t-10)  33 0.194508 .1245294    .3270092
Ethnic(t)  21 0.264663 .1964563    .4114405 Ethnic(t)  33 0.293621 .2108922      .40505
Frac. Black(t-10) 21 0.089928 .0348796      .21687 Frac. Black(t-10) 33 0.10792 .0529065     .203928
Frac. Black(t) 21 0.098622 .0468097    .2428612 Frac. Black(t) 33 0.101751 .0556345    .2656905
Frac. Minrty(t-10) 21 0.091503 .0359641    .2196268 Frac. Minrty(t-10) 33 0.109021 .0659537    .2053961
Frac. Minrty(t) 21 0.155286 .1083713    .2895482 Frac. Minrty(t) 33 0.168885 .1170527    .2795585
Subsample Increasing SINGLE DISTRICT Subsample Increasing SINGLE DISTRICT
-- Binom. Interp. -- -- Binom. Interp. --
Variable Obs Median [95% Conf. Interval] Variable Obs Median [95% Conf. Interval]
Ethnic(t-10)  47 0.399117 .3215923    .4472221 Ethnic(t-10)  60 0.373299 .3035595    .4265772
Ethnic(t)  47 0.447266 .3823418    .4795029 Ethnic(t)  60 0.429007 .3687487    .4599396
Frac. Black(t-10) 47 0.273235 .1994838    .3360678 Frac. Black(t-10) 60 0.244803 .1787823    .3061703
Frac. Black(t) 47 0.284737 .2312183    .3751268 Frac. Black(t) 60 0.25262 .1942273    .3326913
Frac. Minrty(t-10) 47 0.274588 .2008917    .3368007 Frac. Minrty(t-10) 60 0.24784 .1839426    .3074507
Frac. Minrty(t) 47 0.301235 .2507999    .3861642 Frac. Minrty(t) 60 0.293116 .2378248   .3573126
Period 1980-1990
Voting Rights Act - South States fully covered Voting Rights Act - All South States with some  coverage
Subsample Decreasing SINGLE DISTRICT Subsample Decreasing SINGLE DISTRICT
-- Binom. Interp. -- -- Binom. Interp. --
Variable Obs Median [95% Conf. Interval] Variable Obs Median [95% Conf. Interval]
Ethnic(t-10)  17 0.217387 .1443274    .3484081 Ethnic(t-10)  30 0.231083 .1419625    .3267115
Ethnic(t)  17 0.315041 .2239849    .4026764 Ethnic(t)  30 0.312536 .2282883    .3680777
Frac. Black(t-10) 17 0.089428 .0521425     .160876 Frac. Black(t-10) 30 0.094368 .0548517    .1727142
Frac. Black(t) 17 0.128993 .043128    .1980163 Frac. Black(t) 30 0.143769 .0895188    .1661797
Frac. Minrty(t-10) 17 0.124092 .0770264    .2160449 Frac. Minrty(t-10) 30 0.130488 .0766336    .2023592
Frac. Minrty(t) 17 0.182511 .1253335    .2545895 Frac. Minrty(t) 30 0.182582 .1275517    .2312641
Subsample Increasing SINGLE DISTRICT Subsample Increasing SINGLE DISTRICT
-- Binom. Interp. -- -- Binom. Interp. --
Variable Obs Median [95% Conf. Interval] Variable Obs Median [95% Conf. Interval]
Ethnic(t-10)  65 0.347108 .3075647    .3947446 Ethnic(t-10)  86 0.368366 .3349446    .4078901
Ethnic(t)  67 0.40034 .3682412    .4260964 Ethnic(t)  88 0.406157 .3725483    .4366212
Frac. Black(t-10) 65 0.165714 .1039453    .2080752 Frac. Black(t-10) 86 0.19266 .1584294    .2327117
Frac. Black(t) 67 0.179089 .144787    .2106473 Frac. Black(t) 88 0.200002 .1642106    .2602224
Frac. Minrty(t-10) 65 0.219606 .1854808    .2644502 Frac. Minrty(t-10) 86 0.229868 .2097406    .2767364
Frac. Minrty(t) 67 0.256799 .2300964    .2818591 Frac. Minrty(t) 88 0.272591 .2359458    .3136792
Period 1990-2000
Voting Rights Act - South States fully covered Voting Rights Act - All South States with some coverage
Subsample Decreasing SINGLE DISTRICT Subsample Decreasing SINGLE DISTRICT
-- Binom. Interp. -- -- Binom. Interp. --
Variable Obs Median [95% Conf. Interval] Variable Obs Median [95% Conf. Interval]
Ethnic(t-10)  18 0.395447 .3501902    .4837628 Ethnic(t-10)  21 0.406057 .3756696    .4828541
Ethnic(t)  20 0.441584 .3721584    .4774563 Ethnic(t)  23 0.455352 .3991932    .5043442
Frac. Black(t-10) 18 0.113582 .0628309     .255522 Frac. Black(t-10) 21 0.179089 .0732573    .2642068
Frac. Black(t) 20 0.176006 .0598381    .2968652 Frac. Black(t) 23 0.239966 .0882167    .3533759
Frac. Minrty(t-10) 18 0.255387 .2146877    .3557325 Frac. Minrty(t-10) 21 0.261304 .2340239    .3530408
Frac. Minrty(t) 20 0.29508 .2291953    .3703512 Frac. Minrty(t) 23 0.324099 .2464538    .4250296
Subsample Increasing SINGLE DISTRICT Subsample Increasing SINGLE DISTRICT
-- Binom. Interp. -- -- Binom. Interp. --
Variable Obs Median [95% Conf. Interval] Variable Obs Median [95% Conf. Interval]
Ethnic(t-10)  42 0.413317 .3798746    .4660986 Ethnic(t-10)  61 0.41117 .3318195     .442139
Ethnic(t)  46 0.448415 .4033347    .4838997 Ethnic(t)  67 0.447307 .4036738    .4723136
Frac. Black(t-10) 42 0.181325 .1063943    .2678239 Frac. Black(t-10) 61 0.172879 .1219406    .2654401
Frac. Black(t) 46 0.214429 .1339626    .3017227 Frac. Black(t) 67 0.216827 .1495089    .2823543
Frac. Minrty(t-10) 42 0.275677 .2340786    .3207284 Frac. Minrty(t-10) 61 0.275659 .2040158    .3016066
Frac. Minrty(t) 46 0.323101 .2709005     .373635 Frac. Minrty(t) 67 0.322583 .2719806    .3521422Notes: time period t for each variable refers to the final date of the period (for instance t=2000 for period 1990-2000). States fully 
covered under the 1975 renewal of the Voting Rights Act are Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, 
and Virginia. Florida and North Carolina are only partially covered. Data exclude cities for which the change in electoral rule was 
dictated by court mandate or State law.Table VII
































Panel (a): City Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: Fraction of councilmen elected by district
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Frac. Minority -0.885 -1.307 -1.332 -1.305 -0.85 -1.27 -0.849
[0.308]*** [0.393]*** [0.404]*** [0.393]*** [0.433]** [0.380]*** [0.415]**
(Frac. Minority)^2 1.514 1.781 2.136 1.79 1.358 1.702 1.305
[0.475]*** [0.558]*** [0.608]*** [0.563]*** [0.584]** [0.525]*** [0.545]**
Log(City Population) 0.002 -0.007 0.013 -0.01 -0.034 -0.011 -0.022
[0.038] [0.056] [0.058] [0.060] [0.059] [0.051] [0.054]
Log(Median Income) 0.018 0.043 0.022
[0.139] [0.146] [0.137]
State trend Included Included
Observations 4011 1992 1872 1991 1991 2171 2170
Number of cities 1914 962 901 962 962 1056 1056
R-squared 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.74 0.72 0.75
Panel (b): Arellano-Bond GMM
Dependent variable: Fraction of councilmen elected by district
(1) (2) (3)
Lag Single District 0.313 0.293 0.276
[0.056]*** [0.082]*** [0.079]***
Frac. Minority -1.644 -2.326 -2.389
[0.712]** [0.831]*** [0.802]***
(Frac. Minority)^2 2.649 2.66 2.683
[1.002]*** [1.053]** [0.983]***
Log(City Population) -0.342 -0.182 -0.163
[0.258] [0.282] [0.282]
Second Order Serial 
Correlation p-value  0.140 0.04 0.046
J test p-value 0.123 0.172 0.142
Observations 1506 768 758
Number of cities 797 399 391
Notes: Standard errors in brackets below coefficients. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. In panel (a) standard errors are clustered at the city level. All regressions include year 
fixed effects. Both Panel (a) and (b) refer to period 1970-2000. States fully covered under the 1975 
renewal of the Voting Rights Act are Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, 
and Virginia.Table VIII
















2500 South South All U.S. South
Panel (a): Post 1967
Dependent variable: Form of government index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Frac. Minority -0.428 -0.405 -0.458 -0.236 -0.211 -0.143
[0.347] [0.367] [0.348] [0.388] [0.244] [0.258]
(Frac. Minority)^2 0.699 0.748 0.658 0.375 0.459 0.295
[0.515] [0.587] [0.511] [0.535] [0.325] [0.322]
Log(City Population) 0.055 0.067 0.077 0.078 0.036 0.047
[0.048] [0.057] [0.051] [0.050] [0.037] [0.036]
Log(Median Income) -0.141 -0.135 -0.135
[0.088] [0.091] [0.065]**
State trend Included Included
Observations 4492 4161 4491 4491 14082 14081
Number of cities 1980 1812 1980 1980 6827 6827
R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.8 0.86 0.86
Panel (b): Pre 1967
Dependent variable: Form of government index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Frac. Minority 0.091 0.387 -0.481 -0.455
[0.650] [0.970] [1.143] [1.194]
(Frac. Minority)^2 0.378 -0.175 0.742 0.687
[0.815] [1.648] [1.782] [1.873]
Log(City Population) 0.018 0.017 0.059 0.046
[0.066] [0.066] [0.061] [0.065]
Log(Median Income) -0.226 -0.188
[0.082]*** [0.085]**
State trend Included
Observations 2454 2447 2087 2087
Number of cities 979 974 978 978
R-squared 0.77 0.77 0.82 0.83
Notes: Corrected standard errors in brackets below coefficients. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. In panels (a) and (b) standard errors are clustered at 
the city level. All regressions include year fixed effects. Panel (a) covers the period 1970-
2000. Panel (b) covers the period 1930-1970.-
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Panel (a): Post 1967
Dependent variable: Form of government index
(1) (2) (3)
Lag Form of Gov. 0.444 0.459 0.44
[0.059]*** [0.060]*** [0.053]***
Frac. Minority -1.231 -1.306 -0.862
[0.654]* [0.670]* [0.596]
(Frac. Minority)^2 0.997 1.185 0.868
[0.775] [0.787] [0.640]
Log(City Population) -0.036 -0.093 -0.175
[0.224] [0.247] [0.226]
Second Order Serial 
Correlation p-value  0.161 0.131 0.094
J test p-value 0.069 0.119 0.101
Observations 1848 1820 3291
Number of cities 940 914 2383
Panel (b): Pre 1967
Dependent variable: Form of government index
(1) (2)
Lag Form of Gov. 0.55 0.55
[0.091]*** [0.091]***
Frac. Minority 8.964 8.964
[7.688] [7.688]
(Frac. Minority)^2 -11.995 -11.995
[11.956] [11.956]
Log(City Population) 0.859 0.859
[0.405]** [0.405]**
Second Order Serial 
Correlation p-value  0.662 0.662
J test p-value 0.173 0.173
Observations 938 938
Number of cities 473 473
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets below 
coefficients. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. Lag Form of Gov. is the the first lag of 
the dependent variable. All regressions include year fixed 
effects. Panel (a) covers the period 1970-2000. Panel (b) 
covers the period 1930-1970. Both ethnic 
fractionalization and population are treated as 
endogenous variables. The maximum number of lags 
used for instrumenting them is 2. Table X

















Sample: South South South
South, 
Cities > 
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Frac. Minority 0.281 0.138 -0.908 -0.413 -0.927 -0.074 0.811 0.879
[0.154]* [0.517] [1.610] [1.596] [1.635] [1.682] [0.954] [0.982]
(Frac. Minority)^2 -0.375 0.345 1.137 0.247 1.144 0.577 -0.36 -0.452
[0.185]** [0.700] [2.268] [2.235] [2.270] [2.424] [1.260] [1.280]
Log(City 
Population) 0.033 0.068 0.089 -0.004 0.093 0.003 0.054 0.013
[0.024] [0.061] [0.149] [0.169] [0.161] [0.189] [0.087] [0.111]
Log(Median 
Income) -0.027 0.065 0.2
[0.393] [0.434] [0.240]
State trend Included
Observations 3488 4423 2754 2504 2754 2754 9488 8731
Number of cities 1723 1970 1547 1391 1547 1547 5474 4989
R-squared 0.77 0.86 0.89 0.9 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.88
Notes: Standard errors in brackets below coefficients. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. All regressions include year fixed effects. Term limit of mayor 
is computed as 1-max no. terms/8 if term limits are present, 0 otherwise. The executive index is computed as 
the sum of 1 if the system is mayor-council, 1 if the mayor has veto power, and lenght of term for the mayor 























1980 mean 0.264445 0.366814 0.067241 22787.53 22809.2 1980 mean 0.23934 0.377363 0.09799 22559.6 21573.12
st. dev. 0.408385 0.683129 0.111262 142177.4 8163.656 st. dev. 0.395861 0.647312 0.137489 127573.8 7987.236
min. 0 -1 0 161 8347.087 min. 0 -1 0 113 6479.371
max. 1 1 0.95962 7071638 91020.62 max. 1 1 0.998817 7071638 91020.62
N. obs. 2870 3176 3151 3176 3176 N. obs. 3943 4338 4297 4338 4338
1990 mean 0.221614 0.352992 0.085131 20925.98 25754.26 1990 mean 0.22391 0.3656 0.118933 20816.74 23949.99
st. dev. 0.381637 0.662213 0.129206 75066.69 11934.09 st. dev. 0.382196 0.625077 0.153624 69684.18 11484.99
min. 0 -1 0 107 6783.474 min. 0 -1 0 107 5696.253
max. 1 1 0.994365 3485398 114767.4 max. 1 1 0.994365 3485398 114767.4
N. obs. 2904 3476 3455 3476 3476 N. obs. 3976 4814 4754 4814 4814
2000 mean 0.275712 0.278485 0.125633 22625.3 27690.47 2000 mean 0.287567 0.290456 0.158393 23113.37 26127.72
st. dev. 0.407991 0.660554 0.153197 83089.34 12362.81 st. dev. 0.412552 0.623114 0.171226 84880.19 12285.1
min. 0 -1 0 124 8470.961 min. 0 -1 0 124 8309.526
max. 1 1 0.979246 3694834 116144.6 max. 1 1 0.993369 3694834 116144.6
N. obs. 2671 2984 2984 2984 2984 N. obs. 3681 4097 4097 4097 4097
Total mean 0.25328 0.334475 0.091855 22065.77 25383.17 Total mean 0.249355 0.346215 0.124384 22097.58 23845.18
st. dev. 0.399898 0.669677 0.133983 104075.6 11159.28 st. dev. 0.397537 0.632916 0.15634 96543.37 10898.35
min. 0 -1 0 107 6783.474 min. 0 -1 0 107 5696.253
max. 1 1 0.994365 7071638 116144.6 max. 1 1 0.998817 7071638 116144.6
N. obs. 8445 9636 9590 9636 9636 N. obs. 11600 13249 13148 13249 13249
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1930 mean 0.190187 0.614458 0.240152 55689.73
st. dev. 0.341789 0.67566 0.152765 97710.1
min. 0 -1 0.00094 284.928
max. 0.947368 1 0.96162 804874.1
N. obs. 144 166 137 137
1940 mean 0.367765 0.231325 0.221453 44127.13
st. dev. 0.459492 0.795204 0.145513 85805.16
min. 0 -1 0.000239 4868
max. 1 1 0.597693 859100.3
N. obs. 415 415 229 229
1950 mean 0.345231 0.254065 0.208854 32005.15
st. dev. 0.452349 0.74599 0.144826 73305.76
min. 0 -1 0.000111 2774
max. 1 1 0.723511 949708.4
N. obs. 486 492 492 492
1960 mean 0.253952 0.264264 0.194137 34242.28
st. dev. 0.41375 0.675556 0.145493 82867.91
min. 0 -1 0 3202.001
max. 1 1 0.694678 939023.6
N. obs. 656 666 663 663
1970 mean 0.161332 0.283726 0.17797 29274.97
st. dev. 0.354326 0.555411 0.150278 79091.1
min. 0 -1 0 2406
max. 1 1 0.770336 1199388
N. obs. 904 934 936 936
1980 mean 0.17219 0.406196 0.182536 21936.64
st. dev. 0.351701 0.536582 0.164655 74266.77
min. 0 -1 0 113
max. 1 1 0.998817 1595138
N. obs. 1073 1162 1146 1162
1990 mean 0.23013 0.398356 0.208838 20532.95
st. dev. 0.383814 0.515051 0.175684 53238.92
min. 0 -1 0 243
max. 1 1 0.986468 935926.6
N. obs. 1072 1338 1299 1338
2000 mean 0.318919 0.322552 0.246224 24421.92
st. dev. 0.422985 0.50821 0.185563 89530.48
min. 0 -1 0 138
max. 1 1 0.993369 1954847
N. obs. 1010 1113 1113 1113
Total mean 0.24545 0.33853 0.205515 26973.67
st. dev. 0.401669 0.593737 0.166296 76418.88
min. 0 -1 0 113
max. 1 1 0.998817 1954847
N. obs. 5760 6286 6015 6070
Table DII
Summary Statistics (South sample)
South RegionTable DIII 
Voting Rights Act Coverage: Applicable Date; Fed. Register; Date 
 
States Covered as a Whole:  
 
Alabama   Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
Alaska    Nov. 1, 1972  40 FR 49422  Oct. 22, 1975. 
Arizona   Nov. 1, 1972  40 FR 43746  Sept. 23, 1975. 
Georgia   Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
Louisiana   Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
Mississippi   Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
South Carolina Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
Texas     Nov. 1, 1972  40 FR 43746  Sept. 23, 1975. 
Virginia   Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
 
Covered Counties in States Not Covered as a Whole: 
      
California:       
  Kings County   Nov. 1, 1972  40 FR 43746  Sept. 23. 1975. 
  Merced County  Nov. 1, 1972  40 FR 43746  Sept. 23, 1975. 
  Monterey County  Nov. 1, 1968  36 FR 5809  Mar. 27, 1971. 
  Yuba County    Nov. 1, 1968  36 FR 5809  Mar. 27, 1971. 
  Yuba County    Nov. 1, 1972  41 FR 784  Jan. 5, 1976. 
F l o r i d a :       
  Collier County    Nov. 1, 1972  41 FR 34329  Aug. 13, 1976. 
  Hardee County  Nov. 1, 1972  40 FR 43746  Sept. 23, 1975. 
  Hendry County  Nov. 1, 1972  41 FR 34329  Aug. 13, 1976. 
  Hillsborough County  Nov. 1, 1972  40 FR 43746  Sept. 23, 1975. 
  Monroe County  Nov. 1, 1972  40 FR 43746  Sept. 23, 1975. 
New  York:       
  Bronx County   Nov. 1, 1968  36 FR 5809  Mar. 27, 1971. 
  Bronx County   Nov. 1, 1972  40 FR 43746  Sept. 23, 1975. 
  Kings County   Nov. 1, 1968  36 FR 5809  Mar. 27, 1971. 
  Kings County   Nov. 1, 1972  40 FR 43746  Sept. 23, 1975. 
  New York County  Nov. 1, 1968  36 FR 5809  Mar. 27, 1971. 
North  Carolina:       
  Anson County   Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Beaufort County  Nov. 1, 1964  31 FR 5081  Mar. 29, 1966. 
  Bertie County   Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Bladen County  Nov. 1, 1964  31 FR 5081  Mar. 29, 1966. 
  Camden County  Nov. 1, 1964  31 FR 3317  Mar. 2, 1966. 
  Caswell County  Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Chowan County  Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Cleveland County  Nov. 1, 1964  31 FR 5081  Mar. 29, 1966. 
  Craven County  Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Cumberland County  Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965.   Edgecombe County  Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Franklin County  Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Gaston County  Nov. 1, 1964  31 FR 5081  Mar. 29, 1966. 
  Gates County    Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Granville County  Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Greene County  Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Guilford County  Nov. 1, 1964  31 FR 5081  Mar. 29, 1966. 
  Halifax County  Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Harnett County  Nov. 1, 1964  31 FR 5081  Mar. 29, 1966. 
  Hertford County  Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Hoke County    Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Jackson County  Nov. 1, 1972  40 FR 49422  Oct. 22, 1975. 
  Lee County    Nov. 1, 1964  31 FR 5081  Mar. 29, 1966. 
  Lenoir County   Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Martin County   Nov. 1, 1964  31 FR 19  Jan. 4, 1966. 
  Nash County    Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Northampton County  Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Onslow County  Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Pasquotank County  Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Perquimans County  Nov. 1, 1964  31 FR 3317  Mar. 2, 1966. 
  Person County   Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Pitt County    Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Robeson County  Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Rockingham County  Nov. 1, 1964  31 FR 5081  Mar. 29, 1966. 
  Scotland County  Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Union County   Nov. 1, 1964  31 FR 5081  Mar. 29, 1966. 
  Vance County   Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Washington County  Nov. 1, 1964  31 FR 19  Jan. 4, 1966. 
  Wayne County  Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
  Wilson County  Nov. 1, 1964  30 FR 9897  Aug. 7, 1965. 
South  Dakota:       
  Shannon County  Nov. 1, 1972  41 FR 784  Jan. 5, 1976. 
  Todd County    Nov. 1, 1972  41 FR 784  Jan. 5, 1976. 
 
Covered Townships in States Not Covered as a Whole     
      
Michigan:       
  Allegan County: Clyde Township  Nov. 1, 1972  41 FR 34329  Aug. 13, 1976. 
  Saginaw County: Buena Vista Township Nov. 1, 1972 41 FR 34329 Aug. 13, 
1976. 
New  Hampshire:       
  Cheshire County:  Rindge Town  Nov. 1, 1968  39 FR 16912  May 10, 1974. 
  Coos County:  Millsfield Township  Nov. 1, 1968  39 FR 16912  May 10, 1974. 
      Pinkhams Grant  Nov. 1, 1968  39 FR 16912  May 10, 1974. 
      Stewartstown Town  Nov. 1, 1968  39 FR 16912  May 10, 1974. 
      Stratford Town  Nov. 1, 1968  39 FR 16912  May 10, 1974.   Grafton County:  Benton Town  Nov. 1, 1968  39 FR 16912  May 10, 1974. 
  Hillsborough County: Antrim Town  Nov. 1, 1968  39 FR 16912  May 10, 1974. 
  Merrimack County: Boscawen Town  Nov. 1, 1968 39 FR 16912 May 10, 1974. 
  Rockingham County: Newington Town Nov. 1, 1968 39 FR 16912  May 10, 
1974. 
  Sullivan County: Unity Town  Nov. 1, 1968  39 FR 16912  May 10, 1974. 
 







year Ethnic Frac. Population Med. Income Ethnic Frac. Population Med. Income Ethnic Frac. Population Med. Income
1980 mean 0.119897 9118.068 19208.98 0.1160492 7172.804 18883.43 0.1467891 22713.42 21484.27
st. dev. 0.1455027 63175.11 6744.721 0.14351 47311.46 6485.699 0.1561237 126620.4 7971.08
min. 0 100 3032.767 0 100 3032.767 0 113 6479.369
max. 0.664348 7071639 91020.63 0.664348 3122307 91020.63 0.6593081 7071639 91020.63
N. obs. 35439 35439 35439 31003 31003 31003 4436 4436 4436
1990 mean 0.1006002 6170.385 20617.8 0.0919233 4444.582 20215.08 0.1712403 20220.49 23896.39
st. dev. 0.1471291 50790.99 8899.342 0.1423105 48046.86 8439.477 0.1655406 67579.89 11492.09
min. 0 100 3824.79 0 100 3824.79 0 107 5696.251
max. 0.6645895 7322564 114767.4 0.6645895 7322564 114767.4 0.6546158 3485398 114767.4
N. obs. 44929 44929 44929 40014 40014 40014 4915 4915 4915
2000 mean 0.1501133 8582.013 22822.19 0.1439961 7315.146 22528.88 0.2196418 22981.33 26156
st. dev. 0.1628525 62828.02 9093.845 0.1607504 60455.36 8684.614 0.1702933 83952.82 12382.84
min. 0 100 2177.7 0 100 2177.7 0 124 8309.523
max. 0.6665496 8008278 116144.6 0.6665496 8008278 116144.6 0.6632373 3694834 116144.6
N. obs. 51851 51851 51851 47658 47658 47658 4193 4193 4193
Total mean 0.1251894 7906.204 21104.66 0.1191376 6310.084 20796.38 0.1782162 21891.7 23805.9
st. dev. 0.1545542 59126.08 8586.952 0.151941 53222 8219.904 0.166656 95344.94 10939.28
min. 0 100 2177.7 0 100 2177.7 0 107 5696.251
max. 0.6665496 8008278 116144.6 0.6665496 8008278 116144.6 0.6632373 7071639 116144.6
N. obs. 132219 132219 132219 118675 118675 118675 13544 13544 13544
Note: Median income equal to 0 indicates a value of income zeroed by the U.S. Census for confidentiality purposes. Only 2 municipalities in 
1980 and 2 in 2000 required such treatment and were dropped from the sample. 11185 municipalities below 100 inhabitants were dropped 
and 4 obs. with inconsistent racial data were dropped. 
Table A I: Sample Selection (years 1980-2000)
Census Places and selected MCD's Not 
in ICMA Sample
ICMA Form of Government Sample 
(ICMA Survey Respondents) All Census Places and selected MCD's
year Ethnic Frac. Population Med. Income
2000 mean 0.2208746 22780.94 25502.09
st. dev. 0.1740321 121694.4 12237.76
min. 0 124 5897.793
max. 0.6658266 8008278 116144.6
N. obs. 7757 7757 7757
2000 mean 0.2196418 22981.33 26156
st. dev. 0.1702933 83952.82 12382.84
min. 0 124 8309.523
max. 0.6632373 3694834 116144.6
N. obs. 4193 4193 4193
2000 mean 0.2223249 22545.18 24732.77
st. dev. 0.1783436 154742.4 12021.1
min. 0 124 5897.793
max. 0.6658266 8008278 116144.6
N. obs. 3564 3564 3564
Note: the ICMA 2001 FOG survey sample universe has 
been provided by ICMA. We thank Sebia Clark  for 
making the data available to us.
Table A II: Response Selection (year 2000)
ICMA Form of Government Full Sample
ICMA Survey Respondents




year Ethnic Frac. Population Med. Income Ethnic Frac. Population Med. Income Ethnic Frac. Population Med. Income
1930 mean 0.3292589 22008.04 . 0.331009 8764.79 . 0.3248581 55308.09 .
st. dev. 0.1502718 60550.19 . 0.1526281 27382.69 . 0.1446257 97456.01 .
min. 0.0018783 284.928 . 0.0042565 1985.251 . 0.0018783 284.928 .
max. 0.6480194 804874 . 0.5599921 505508 . 0.6480194 804874 .
N. obs. 485 485 . 347 347 . 138 138 .
1940 mean 0.3030753 28999.28 . 0.3029203 5904.107 . 0.3031768 44127.13 .
st. dev. 0.1564919 69525.07 . 0.162654 10389.01 . 0.1526823 85805.15 .
min. 0.0004773 2522 . 0.003721 2522 . 0.0004773 4868 .
max. 0.501893 859100 . 0.501893 111580 . 0.500385 859100 .
N. obs. 379 379 . 150 150 . 229 229 .
1950 mean 0.2554969 15490.66 9398.706 0.2360436 6030.967 9272.253 0.2893527 31953.97 9619.227
st. dev. 0.1734978 52227.8 6513.281 0.1790261 31175.21 3651.893 0.157986 73240.03 9654.049
min. 0 1012 975.1038 0 1012 1937.759 0.0002228 2774 975.1038
max. 0.5287216 949708 215854.8 0.5287216 802178 41493.78 0.5028492 949708 215854.8
N. obs. 1351 1351 1350 858 858 858 493 493 492
1960 mean 0.2346919 17858.46 13421.45 0.2094234 6570.596 13895.89 0.2711151 34129.25 12728.9
st. dev. 0.1769923 58170.46 4990.751 0.1821448 26076.79 5552.122 0.1626483 82698.15 3936.007
min. 0 1851 2094.594 0 1851 2094.594 0 3202 2324.324
max. 0.5097046 939024 42929.05 0.5097046 763956 36564.19 0.5051175 939024 42929.05
N. obs. 1626 1626 1648 960 960 978 666 666 670
1970 mean 0.2113373 17452.66 21521.73 0.2018225 9929.842 21489.66 0.2412711 41119.77 21622.34
st. dev. 0.1742144 58033.25 7005.694 0.1744557 32521.35 7413.138 0.1701882 99564.85 5541.271
min. 0 1235 4692.664 0 1235 4692.664 0 4906 10051.55
max. 0.5558298 1199388 76871.13 0.5558298 730359 76871.13 0.5053402 1199388 59262.89
N. obs. 2044 2044 2040 1551 1551 1547 493 493 493
Total mean 0.2435539 18233.4 15623.49 0.2268228 7969.613 16195.77 0.2755909 37886.61 14453.68
st. dev. 0.1754291 57900.31 8089.185 0.1794255 29711.03 7994.725 0.1628231 86579.32 8157.32
min. 0 284.928 975.1038 0 1012 1937.759 0 284.928 975.1038
max. 0.6480194 1199388 215854.8 0.5599921 802178 76871.13 0.6480194 1199388 215854.8
N. obs. 5885 5885 5038 3866 3866 3383 2019 2019 1655
Note: The table includes only observations with non missing values.
Table A III: Sample Selection (years 1930-1970)
All Census Places and selected MCD's Census Places and selected MCD's Not  ICMA Form of Government Sample 